Driving TOur
Introduction
This year marks the 240th anniversary of the Whitemarsh encampment and related skirmishes. Except for the general lay of the land, the hills, and streams, it is hard to imagine what the area was like during those days. Rather than the busyness of the roadways and the seemingly endless and seamless neighborhoods, businesses and people, the region was quite rural. The population was small compared to the millions who live in the Delaware Valley today. Philadelphia’s northernmost outskirts lay just past present day Vine Street. Beyond lay scattered farms, small hamlets and occasional taverns. The area was covered by virgin stands of forest with relatively few areas of cleared land for fields. Nothing of the modern layout of roads and streets existed, even in one’s imagination. The roads that did exist were underdeveloped and difficult to traverse. Only a few existed heading north out of Philadelphia. York Road was the main conduit up to New York City, crossing the Delaware River in Bucks County. Branching off to the northwest, not far from the city limits, were the Germantown Road and, splitting off from that at Chestnut Hill, Bethlehem Pike, known then as the North Wales Road. Ridge Pike followed the Schuylkill River roughly parallel to the Germantown Road. A few other roads existed at the time, connecting communities and various sites including the Abington Road (Washington Lane), White Church Road (Church Road), Limekiln Pike and Susquehanna Road, all of which play into the following narrative. Faint trails and underdeveloped byways connected some of these highways. So, it was through this rural landscape that the armies under question marched and made battle with each other from December 5–8, 1777.
The time of year also plays into the following narrative. The experiences at Valley Forge are well known to the student of American history, but the weeks leading up to that episode were just as challenging, with increasing cold and occasional snow and chilling rain. Many soldiers suffered from exposure. In some ways, the time leading up to Valley Forge was not much different in terms of the physical experience than the time to come. In addition, the soldiers in the Continental Army were under significant stress due to the fighting of the previous two months as well as the possibility of more with the British only fourteen miles away, ensconced—warmly—in Philadelphia. As at Valley Forge, the troops had little food, many had no shoes and there seemingly was little relief to expect from the Congress, which had high-tailed it out to Lancaster. It was a bitter and demoralizing situation. Yet, there was hope. Only weeks before, General Horatio Gates had defeated the British at the Battle of Saratoga thus, in some people’s minds, turning the tide of the war. On top of that, some troops from that victory, including Daniel Morgan and his riflemen, had come south to join Washington’s troops. These marksmen would figure prominently in the skirmishing at Edge Hill during the following days, bolstering the morale of Washington’s troops. It should finally be noted that the Delaware Valley is an area lush in vegetation. Since the encampment and fighting took place from early November to the middle of December, the landscape appeared quite different. There were no leaves on the trees, making it easier for both sides to see the movements of their enemy. Most of the following narrative develops the events from the night of December 4–5 through December 8, although the wider context of the episode is presented as well.
Because the movements of the British troops were quite widespread over the four days, the narrative and tour is divided into three sections: the Whitemarsh Encampment, the fighting and depredations around Chestnut Hill and Germantown and finally, the fighting around Edge Hill. There are twelve stops, starting and ending at Fort Hill in Fort Washington. For each section, there are italicized directions along with information regarding the route and destinations. Rather than simply stating addresses or GPS coordinates, we felt it best to include specific directions to ensure that the tourist followed the same routes as the units of the two armies. In addition, the twelve stops are lettered, but divided into two parts in order to correspond to the Google map. Stop "I" is the same as "A - Part 2." From there, the letters follow as Part 2.
Enjoy the tour and learn about the Battle of Whitemarsh!
This year marks the 240th anniversary of the Whitemarsh encampment and related skirmishes. Except for the general lay of the land, the hills, and streams, it is hard to imagine what the area was like during those days. Rather than the busyness of the roadways and the seemingly endless and seamless neighborhoods, businesses and people, the region was quite rural. The population was small compared to the millions who live in the Delaware Valley today. Philadelphia’s northernmost outskirts lay just past present day Vine Street. Beyond lay scattered farms, small hamlets and occasional taverns. The area was covered by virgin stands of forest with relatively few areas of cleared land for fields. Nothing of the modern layout of roads and streets existed, even in one’s imagination. The roads that did exist were underdeveloped and difficult to traverse. Only a few existed heading north out of Philadelphia. York Road was the main conduit up to New York City, crossing the Delaware River in Bucks County. Branching off to the northwest, not far from the city limits, were the Germantown Road and, splitting off from that at Chestnut Hill, Bethlehem Pike, known then as the North Wales Road. Ridge Pike followed the Schuylkill River roughly parallel to the Germantown Road. A few other roads existed at the time, connecting communities and various sites including the Abington Road (Washington Lane), White Church Road (Church Road), Limekiln Pike and Susquehanna Road, all of which play into the following narrative. Faint trails and underdeveloped byways connected some of these highways. So, it was through this rural landscape that the armies under question marched and made battle with each other from December 5–8, 1777.
The time of year also plays into the following narrative. The experiences at Valley Forge are well known to the student of American history, but the weeks leading up to that episode were just as challenging, with increasing cold and occasional snow and chilling rain. Many soldiers suffered from exposure. In some ways, the time leading up to Valley Forge was not much different in terms of the physical experience than the time to come. In addition, the soldiers in the Continental Army were under significant stress due to the fighting of the previous two months as well as the possibility of more with the British only fourteen miles away, ensconced—warmly—in Philadelphia. As at Valley Forge, the troops had little food, many had no shoes and there seemingly was little relief to expect from the Congress, which had high-tailed it out to Lancaster. It was a bitter and demoralizing situation. Yet, there was hope. Only weeks before, General Horatio Gates had defeated the British at the Battle of Saratoga thus, in some people’s minds, turning the tide of the war. On top of that, some troops from that victory, including Daniel Morgan and his riflemen, had come south to join Washington’s troops. These marksmen would figure prominently in the skirmishing at Edge Hill during the following days, bolstering the morale of Washington’s troops. It should finally be noted that the Delaware Valley is an area lush in vegetation. Since the encampment and fighting took place from early November to the middle of December, the landscape appeared quite different. There were no leaves on the trees, making it easier for both sides to see the movements of their enemy. Most of the following narrative develops the events from the night of December 4–5 through December 8, although the wider context of the episode is presented as well.
Because the movements of the British troops were quite widespread over the four days, the narrative and tour is divided into three sections: the Whitemarsh Encampment, the fighting and depredations around Chestnut Hill and Germantown and finally, the fighting around Edge Hill. There are twelve stops, starting and ending at Fort Hill in Fort Washington. For each section, there are italicized directions along with information regarding the route and destinations. Rather than simply stating addresses or GPS coordinates, we felt it best to include specific directions to ensure that the tourist followed the same routes as the units of the two armies. In addition, the twelve stops are lettered, but divided into two parts in order to correspond to the Google map. Stop "I" is the same as "A - Part 2." From there, the letters follow as Part 2.
Enjoy the tour and learn about the Battle of Whitemarsh!
Whitemarsh Encampment Section
Stop A: Fort Hill
Fort Hill is located across from the Fort Washington State Park Headquarters at 500 South Bethlehem Pike, Fort Washington, PA 19034. Proceed to the top of the hill where the fort (redoubt) was located. (If the gate to Fort Hill is closed, proceed to Hope Lodge, just down Bethlehem Pike south of Fort Hill.) Fort Hill is the location of one of the two redoubts built by the Continental forces during the time of the encampment.
The turntables of the American War for Independence were beginning to move more visibly with the onset of the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777. British General William Howe had pitted himself against American Commander George Washington for the second time. This time his eyes were set on the colonists’ capital city, his intentions fixed on totally destroying the Continental Army. Treading the path of numerous other European conquests, Howe envisioned that capturing Philadelphia would be a stab in the heart of the colonial cause. Yet, this move would take Howe’s experienced army away from their New York headquarters and the genius of the Hudson Valley Campaign, which ended with a devastating loss for the British. This decision may have been deadly for the British, for a victory in the Hudson Valley may have ended the war with the ultimate defeat of the colonial cause. While Washington´s defense would not prove strong enough to preserve Philadelphia, it would be enough to keep the British from making any ultimate advance in the war by saving the army to fight another day. At this time, France was watching and waiting for an opening in the war, an indication of where they would make the greatest gains from this once amateur rebellion. By the end of 1777, George Washington was in the midst of putting forward a notable performance, drawing some eagerly awaiting attention. The Philadelphia campaign helped set the stage for French involvement in the revolution and witnessed the slow yet steady perseverance of the American army to stay alive.
At the beginning of this campaign, however, things were looking bleak for Washington and his men. As Howe disembarked with his 18,000 troops at the head of the Chesapeake Bay and crept up into Pennsylvania, Washington rushed to the Philadelphia area to prepare for the impending attack. Opening up with a dramatic flourish, Howe thoroughly routed Washington at the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, 1777. This began a pattern of failure for the Continentals. Following Brandywine and a short standoff between the two armies at the Battle of the Clouds, the Paoli Massacre proved another loss for the Continentals. The British Army was next on their way to Valley Forge in order to ford the Schuylkill River and reach Philadelphia. The Americans, still recovering from the previous battles, had themselves positioned north of the Schuylkill River between Philadelphia and the British army. However, in order to protect the destruction of his men and supply lines, Washington “allowed” Howe to march safely into Philadelphia on September 26. This heavily criticized decision may have been the only option for Washington at this point. Howe’s army spilled out into the hamlets and villages surrounding Philadelphia, with a large group stationed in Germantown to guard the incoming roads.
In response to the loss of the capital city, Washington planned to retake Philadelphia using a brilliant multi-pronged attack against the British line in Germantown. This plan was executed on October 4 but ended in failure due to flawed communication. The Continental Army was forced to retreat. It was during this retreat from Germantown that some of Howe’s men pursued Washington’s troops northward as far as Skippack Pike. During this pursuit, the British hoisted cannons onto Church Hill, where St. Thomas Episcopal Church is located today and fired on the retreating Americans. Despite this failure on the part of Washington, the British had nonetheless been caught off guard and were reminded of Washington’s growing power and prowess in the field. After the retreat from Germantown, Washington and his army wandered the countryside of Montgomery County for a couple of weeks before landing in Whitpain Township, camping there from October 21 through November 2 before moving onto Whitemarsh. Here in Whitpain, Washington established headquarters in a residence called Dawesfield. This gap of space and time between the Battles of Germantown and Whitemarsh was a no man’s land in which tiny skirmishes, spying, and scouting groups were prominent. The British would dispatch these scouts into the area between Philadelphia’s border at Vine Street and the Whitemarsh encampment to gather food, do reconnaissance and, at times, burn homes indiscriminately suspected of holding Continental soldiers. Torching these homes was not an uncommon action by the British, and over time it led to a great number of Tories abandoning their support for England. By the time Washington had arrived in Whitpain, Howe had withdrawn any remaining troops from Germantown and the surrounding areas, pulling them back into Philadelphia south of Vine Street.
For much of the time until this point, the British had been struggling to provide supplies for their army. This was partly due to the presence of two Continental forts on the Delaware River below Philadelphia. These forts—Mifflin on the Pennsylvania side and Mercer on the New Jersey side—commanded the river, thus preventing the British Navy from getting much-needed supplies to the city. Howe, in order to keep Philadelphia, laid a siege on Fort Mifflin in hopes of clearing the waterway. On November 10th, British troops and ships began a heavy bombardment of the fort, forcing an American retreat in the middle of the night. Fort Mercer was abandoned shortly afterward, and the British gained total control of the city and its watery supply line.
On November 2nd, Washington and his troops made the short journey from Whitpain to Whitemarsh. He wanted to be close to the British to keep an eye on them, as well as to take advantage of three of the area’s highest hills if the British decided to march out for an attack. The gap between the two armies was narrowing as if to foreshadow an impending collision.
Proceed to Church Hill - St. Thomas Episcopal Church via the Clifton House and Hope Lodge. To get to the Clifton House, turn right out of the Fort Hill lane and proceed a few hundred yards. Clifton House is on your right. From here, reverse your route past Fort Hill to Hope Lodge. From Hope Lodge, proceed in the same direction and turn left onto Camp Hill Road at the light and RR trestle. Turn right into the main entrance to St. Thomas Church and proceed up to the parking lot near the church building.
Stop A: Fort Hill
Fort Hill is located across from the Fort Washington State Park Headquarters at 500 South Bethlehem Pike, Fort Washington, PA 19034. Proceed to the top of the hill where the fort (redoubt) was located. (If the gate to Fort Hill is closed, proceed to Hope Lodge, just down Bethlehem Pike south of Fort Hill.) Fort Hill is the location of one of the two redoubts built by the Continental forces during the time of the encampment.
The turntables of the American War for Independence were beginning to move more visibly with the onset of the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777. British General William Howe had pitted himself against American Commander George Washington for the second time. This time his eyes were set on the colonists’ capital city, his intentions fixed on totally destroying the Continental Army. Treading the path of numerous other European conquests, Howe envisioned that capturing Philadelphia would be a stab in the heart of the colonial cause. Yet, this move would take Howe’s experienced army away from their New York headquarters and the genius of the Hudson Valley Campaign, which ended with a devastating loss for the British. This decision may have been deadly for the British, for a victory in the Hudson Valley may have ended the war with the ultimate defeat of the colonial cause. While Washington´s defense would not prove strong enough to preserve Philadelphia, it would be enough to keep the British from making any ultimate advance in the war by saving the army to fight another day. At this time, France was watching and waiting for an opening in the war, an indication of where they would make the greatest gains from this once amateur rebellion. By the end of 1777, George Washington was in the midst of putting forward a notable performance, drawing some eagerly awaiting attention. The Philadelphia campaign helped set the stage for French involvement in the revolution and witnessed the slow yet steady perseverance of the American army to stay alive.
At the beginning of this campaign, however, things were looking bleak for Washington and his men. As Howe disembarked with his 18,000 troops at the head of the Chesapeake Bay and crept up into Pennsylvania, Washington rushed to the Philadelphia area to prepare for the impending attack. Opening up with a dramatic flourish, Howe thoroughly routed Washington at the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, 1777. This began a pattern of failure for the Continentals. Following Brandywine and a short standoff between the two armies at the Battle of the Clouds, the Paoli Massacre proved another loss for the Continentals. The British Army was next on their way to Valley Forge in order to ford the Schuylkill River and reach Philadelphia. The Americans, still recovering from the previous battles, had themselves positioned north of the Schuylkill River between Philadelphia and the British army. However, in order to protect the destruction of his men and supply lines, Washington “allowed” Howe to march safely into Philadelphia on September 26. This heavily criticized decision may have been the only option for Washington at this point. Howe’s army spilled out into the hamlets and villages surrounding Philadelphia, with a large group stationed in Germantown to guard the incoming roads.
In response to the loss of the capital city, Washington planned to retake Philadelphia using a brilliant multi-pronged attack against the British line in Germantown. This plan was executed on October 4 but ended in failure due to flawed communication. The Continental Army was forced to retreat. It was during this retreat from Germantown that some of Howe’s men pursued Washington’s troops northward as far as Skippack Pike. During this pursuit, the British hoisted cannons onto Church Hill, where St. Thomas Episcopal Church is located today and fired on the retreating Americans. Despite this failure on the part of Washington, the British had nonetheless been caught off guard and were reminded of Washington’s growing power and prowess in the field. After the retreat from Germantown, Washington and his army wandered the countryside of Montgomery County for a couple of weeks before landing in Whitpain Township, camping there from October 21 through November 2 before moving onto Whitemarsh. Here in Whitpain, Washington established headquarters in a residence called Dawesfield. This gap of space and time between the Battles of Germantown and Whitemarsh was a no man’s land in which tiny skirmishes, spying, and scouting groups were prominent. The British would dispatch these scouts into the area between Philadelphia’s border at Vine Street and the Whitemarsh encampment to gather food, do reconnaissance and, at times, burn homes indiscriminately suspected of holding Continental soldiers. Torching these homes was not an uncommon action by the British, and over time it led to a great number of Tories abandoning their support for England. By the time Washington had arrived in Whitpain, Howe had withdrawn any remaining troops from Germantown and the surrounding areas, pulling them back into Philadelphia south of Vine Street.
For much of the time until this point, the British had been struggling to provide supplies for their army. This was partly due to the presence of two Continental forts on the Delaware River below Philadelphia. These forts—Mifflin on the Pennsylvania side and Mercer on the New Jersey side—commanded the river, thus preventing the British Navy from getting much-needed supplies to the city. Howe, in order to keep Philadelphia, laid a siege on Fort Mifflin in hopes of clearing the waterway. On November 10th, British troops and ships began a heavy bombardment of the fort, forcing an American retreat in the middle of the night. Fort Mercer was abandoned shortly afterward, and the British gained total control of the city and its watery supply line.
On November 2nd, Washington and his troops made the short journey from Whitpain to Whitemarsh. He wanted to be close to the British to keep an eye on them, as well as to take advantage of three of the area’s highest hills if the British decided to march out for an attack. The gap between the two armies was narrowing as if to foreshadow an impending collision.
Proceed to Church Hill - St. Thomas Episcopal Church via the Clifton House and Hope Lodge. To get to the Clifton House, turn right out of the Fort Hill lane and proceed a few hundred yards. Clifton House is on your right. From here, reverse your route past Fort Hill to Hope Lodge. From Hope Lodge, proceed in the same direction and turn left onto Camp Hill Road at the light and RR trestle. Turn right into the main entrance to St. Thomas Church and proceed up to the parking lot near the church building.
Stop B: Church Hill - St. Thomas Episcopal Church (Refer to Encampment Map)
Park in the church parking lot and walk past the front entrance to the overlook of Church Road and Bethlehem Pike. It is here where Washington had his advanced position of 400 men and cannons to guard the crossroads. Among the grave markers across from the front entrance of the church, you will note four blue poles marking the location and dimensions of the church during the time of the encampment.
With the American army now encamped at Whitemarsh, Washington took up headquarters in the Emlen House to make plans for the coming weeks. He had chosen Whitemarsh for a number of reasons and now intended to stay at this location to see what might develop. Being closer to Philadelphia provided Washington with better observation of the British in case they decided to march out. It also afforded him the possibility of mounting an attack of his own. He was tired of losing and felt he needed to make an impression not only on his enemy but also on the Congress and his critics. Washington’s immediate concern, however, was the defense of the army, and the hills of Whitemarsh were key to this plan. The army’s position spread all the way from the rightmost post at Militia Hill to the left end of Camp Hill--a distance of some miles. This defense included troops positioned at Fort Hill as the center of the encampment, as well as a more forward post on Church Hill overlooking the intersection of Church Road and Bethlehem Pike. Here, Washington placed about 400 troops and cannons. Militia Hill became the temporary home of the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut Continental Regiment. The legendary Colonel Daniel Morgan’s riflemen, along with Colonel Mordecai Gist’s Maryland Militia, were assigned to defend the left flank of Camp Hill across the valley from Edge Hill and near the Limekiln and Susquehanna roads. The bulk of the army was placed directly on Camp Hill with the left occupied by Maj. General Nathanael Greene and the right by Maj. General John Sullivan. Redoubts were built on both Camp Hill and Fort Hill. Sandy Run stream provided a natural obstacle at the base of Camp Hill. Many of the officers took up lodging at Hope Lodge, the Clifton House (Sandy Run Tavern), and other residences in the area. Although Washington’s army of 11,000 men did not nearly compare with Howe’s 18,000, the Continental position, as some have described, was a most impregnable fortress.
At the same time, the state of the Continental Army was certainly pitiful. Many of the troops created small, crude shelters along the hillsides to protect themselves from the cold November weather. For some time, Washington had been pleading with Congress to provide more supplies for his troops. One article they especially lacked was shoes. Washington was desperate enough to creatively offer a reward to “any person, who shall, by nine o’clock Monday morning, produce the best substitute for shoes made of raw hides.”
In addition to the army’s lack of food, clothing, and materials, many of the troops were demoralized and angry, as they were still serving in the army after their enlistments were up. Circumstances required their service, though, so this issue was put off for their much-needed support. While Washington scratched his head to come up with sensible solutions to each of these problems, he faced others.
In spite of the perseverance of Washington and his troops under these tough conditions, Washington’s leadership was now called into question. On November 8th, a plot between Brigadier General Thomas Conway and Major General Horatio Gates was exposed by one of Washington’s loyal friends. The troublesome Conway had been skeptical and jealous of Washington’s position as Commander-in-Chief of the American army and had written various letters to other generals to make them aware of Washington’s deficiencies. Conway would suggest that Gates would prove the best solution and leader. After hearing of this, Washington politely yet firmly wrote to Conway to halt the conspiracy. This awkward and insubordinate series of events has come to be called the “Conway Cabal.”
Proceed to Militia Hill via Camp Hill. Turn right out of the St. Thomas Episcopal Church complex onto Camp Hill Road. Continue on Camp Hill Road crossing Pennsylvania Ave. To your left and above is the site of Camp Hill, the location of the second fort or redoubt built by the Continental Army during the time. Just past the intersection noted above, turn right onto Dreshertown Road and proceed to Limekiln Pike. It is along Dreshertown Road that the main line of the Continental Army was encamped during this time. (Refer to encampment map.) Washington’s headquarters at Emlen House were below this ridge to the right. Turn right onto Limekiln Pike and proceed to Twining Road. Turn right onto Twining Road and proceed to Pennsylvania Ave. (Note the height above to your right where the Continental Army was encamped.) Turn right onto Pennsylvania Ave. and proceed to the marker indicating the location of the Emlen House—visible from the road. Stop here. From the marker, continue on Pennsylvania Ave. to Camp Hill Road. Turn left onto Camp Hill Road and proceed to Bethlehem Pike at the light and RR trestle. Proceed through the intersection onto Skippack Pike (Rt. 73) and take the first left onto Militia Hill Road. Take the first left into Fort Washington State Park and proceed up the hill to the observation platform. Walk out onto the platform.
Park in the church parking lot and walk past the front entrance to the overlook of Church Road and Bethlehem Pike. It is here where Washington had his advanced position of 400 men and cannons to guard the crossroads. Among the grave markers across from the front entrance of the church, you will note four blue poles marking the location and dimensions of the church during the time of the encampment.
With the American army now encamped at Whitemarsh, Washington took up headquarters in the Emlen House to make plans for the coming weeks. He had chosen Whitemarsh for a number of reasons and now intended to stay at this location to see what might develop. Being closer to Philadelphia provided Washington with better observation of the British in case they decided to march out. It also afforded him the possibility of mounting an attack of his own. He was tired of losing and felt he needed to make an impression not only on his enemy but also on the Congress and his critics. Washington’s immediate concern, however, was the defense of the army, and the hills of Whitemarsh were key to this plan. The army’s position spread all the way from the rightmost post at Militia Hill to the left end of Camp Hill--a distance of some miles. This defense included troops positioned at Fort Hill as the center of the encampment, as well as a more forward post on Church Hill overlooking the intersection of Church Road and Bethlehem Pike. Here, Washington placed about 400 troops and cannons. Militia Hill became the temporary home of the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut Continental Regiment. The legendary Colonel Daniel Morgan’s riflemen, along with Colonel Mordecai Gist’s Maryland Militia, were assigned to defend the left flank of Camp Hill across the valley from Edge Hill and near the Limekiln and Susquehanna roads. The bulk of the army was placed directly on Camp Hill with the left occupied by Maj. General Nathanael Greene and the right by Maj. General John Sullivan. Redoubts were built on both Camp Hill and Fort Hill. Sandy Run stream provided a natural obstacle at the base of Camp Hill. Many of the officers took up lodging at Hope Lodge, the Clifton House (Sandy Run Tavern), and other residences in the area. Although Washington’s army of 11,000 men did not nearly compare with Howe’s 18,000, the Continental position, as some have described, was a most impregnable fortress.
At the same time, the state of the Continental Army was certainly pitiful. Many of the troops created small, crude shelters along the hillsides to protect themselves from the cold November weather. For some time, Washington had been pleading with Congress to provide more supplies for his troops. One article they especially lacked was shoes. Washington was desperate enough to creatively offer a reward to “any person, who shall, by nine o’clock Monday morning, produce the best substitute for shoes made of raw hides.”
In addition to the army’s lack of food, clothing, and materials, many of the troops were demoralized and angry, as they were still serving in the army after their enlistments were up. Circumstances required their service, though, so this issue was put off for their much-needed support. While Washington scratched his head to come up with sensible solutions to each of these problems, he faced others.
In spite of the perseverance of Washington and his troops under these tough conditions, Washington’s leadership was now called into question. On November 8th, a plot between Brigadier General Thomas Conway and Major General Horatio Gates was exposed by one of Washington’s loyal friends. The troublesome Conway had been skeptical and jealous of Washington’s position as Commander-in-Chief of the American army and had written various letters to other generals to make them aware of Washington’s deficiencies. Conway would suggest that Gates would prove the best solution and leader. After hearing of this, Washington politely yet firmly wrote to Conway to halt the conspiracy. This awkward and insubordinate series of events has come to be called the “Conway Cabal.”
Proceed to Militia Hill via Camp Hill. Turn right out of the St. Thomas Episcopal Church complex onto Camp Hill Road. Continue on Camp Hill Road crossing Pennsylvania Ave. To your left and above is the site of Camp Hill, the location of the second fort or redoubt built by the Continental Army during the time. Just past the intersection noted above, turn right onto Dreshertown Road and proceed to Limekiln Pike. It is along Dreshertown Road that the main line of the Continental Army was encamped during this time. (Refer to encampment map.) Washington’s headquarters at Emlen House were below this ridge to the right. Turn right onto Limekiln Pike and proceed to Twining Road. Turn right onto Twining Road and proceed to Pennsylvania Ave. (Note the height above to your right where the Continental Army was encamped.) Turn right onto Pennsylvania Ave. and proceed to the marker indicating the location of the Emlen House—visible from the road. Stop here. From the marker, continue on Pennsylvania Ave. to Camp Hill Road. Turn left onto Camp Hill Road and proceed to Bethlehem Pike at the light and RR trestle. Proceed through the intersection onto Skippack Pike (Rt. 73) and take the first left onto Militia Hill Road. Take the first left into Fort Washington State Park and proceed up the hill to the observation platform. Walk out onto the platform.
Stop C: Militia Hill (Refer to December 4-5 Map)
Walk out to the platform to overlook the Wissahickon Valley and Flourtown below. Chestnut Hill is across the valley. It is there where fighting would first take place on December 5th. Along this ridge to your right is where the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut were encamped.
All throughout November both Howe and Washington were scheming, tucking strategies and battle tactics up their sleeves that they hoped would provide them with a victory. Washington debated with his council whether or not to make a direct attack on Philadelphia again, but this was quickly put down by a majority of the group. The other option would be to wait for Howe to come to them so that they could overtake his army using the advantage of the hills with perfectly executed troop movements. While these discussions took place, spies were hearing reports of a secret march by Howe to capture Whitemarsh. He wrote, “In the course of last week, from a variety of intelligence I had reason to expect that General Howe was preparing to give us a general action.”
One of these intelligence sources proved very unlikely. Lydia Darragh, a resident of Philadelphia whose home was occupied by British soldiers, heard the signs of an upcoming attack by eavesdropping. Not wishing to see an American defeat, she made the bold and dangerous decision to travel past the British lines to warn Washington of Howe’s plans. Howe was coming, along with about 12,000 troops, the next morning. His objectives were clear-cut and simple: defeat Washington’s army for the final time before winter set in and, in doing so, seal his winning streak on a powerful note. This win would buy Howe fame and honor in England, for he intended to return to his home the following spring.
At around 10:00 p.m. on the evening of December 4th, the British began their journey out of Philadelphia’s safe quarters into the cold, dark night. They would begin their march by moving northward up York Road in the direction of the Continental army. During much of the Philadelphia campaign, Howe’s strategy consisted of three main columns: those led by Lt. General Charles Cornwallis, those under Lt. General Wilhelm von Knyphausen (consisting of mostly Hessian regiments), and those under Maj. General Charles Grey. Howe was fond of staging daring flanking maneuvers and loved to use these three groups in a series of distractions. By this time in the war, Washington had learned to anticipate Howe’s intricate battle designs, and planned to outthink him. These three columns would play important roles in the outcome of the Battle of Whitemarsh. As the British troops marched toward their destination, they were arranged in file as just indicated.
Upon reaching the Rising Sun Tavern, the same ground that Lydia Darragh had stood upon hours before, the British came into contact with American troops under the command of Captain Allen McLane. Here, the column swerved left onto Germantown Road to make their way toward Chestnut Hill, located across the Sandy Run Valley from Whitemarsh. As they continued the twelve-mile march, many of Howe’s soldiers were reliving memories as they passed by the houses and buildings that formed Germantown, including the Cliveden House, the epicenter of the Battle of Germantown—now a deserted wreckage. They continued up Germantown Road, passing the various German residences of the area including Beggarstown and Cresheim Village. All throughout the march, Continental pickets sniped at the enemy column from houses lining the road. Having once fired, these lone pickets would then proceed further up the road. In some cases, British troops would force their way into the houses to drive the Continentals out. The residents of these homes would a couple of days later suffer revenge from the British soldiers. Eventually, most of these sniping pickets would arrive back at camp to give firsthand warnings to Washington of the impending attack. Finally, after a long night of marching, the British troops were ordered to halt. The troops were now at Chestnut Hill, where they made their camp. General Howe established headquarters inside the house of Mathias Bush, at the intersection of Germantown Road and Bethlehem Pike. In choosing this intersection, positioned at two main roads, Howe made a smart tactical move, as it gave the British access to a route of escape or maneuvering. These headquarters also happened to be located at the crest of Chestnut Hill, giving the British their own vantage point paralleling the American’s elevated position two miles away. General Howe created a line of defense beyond the crest of the hill from the Wissahickon Creek on the left to modern day Wyndmoor on the right. Hessian Jägers would form the left flank of the line guarding the ascent of Germantown Road while the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Light Infantry would expand to the right, guarding Bethlehem Pike. The rest of the British force would spread out in a quadrangle to the rear in the Village of Chestnut Hill. Howe and his men would stay here for the next 36 hours before departure.
Meanwhile in the American camp, just before Howe’s men reached the top of Chestnut Hill, Washington had called the alarm to prepare for battle and instructed his troops to each build two campfires in order to scare the British into thinking that the size of their force was much larger than it actually was—a tactic he had used almost a year before in Trenton. When Howe’s army looked out upon the American camp, their eyes were swarmed with thousands of little reminders of the size and magnitude of the enemy army. The British, however, quickly saw through this mind trick and effectively made their camp along the hill.
Proceed to Chestnut Hill College at the intersection of Germantown Pike and Northwestern Ave. To get there, continue along the road of the State Park to Joshua Road and turn left. Proceed on Joshua Road to Germantown Pike and turn left. Proceed on Germantown Road until you get to the aforementioned intersection. (Along the way, note Church Road on your right as you pass through the community of Lafayette Hill. It is just up the street at St. Peter Lutheran Church where the Battle of Barren Hill occurred months later in May of 1778.) When you arrive at Chestnut Hill College stop in the small circle to your right across from the college.
Walk out to the platform to overlook the Wissahickon Valley and Flourtown below. Chestnut Hill is across the valley. It is there where fighting would first take place on December 5th. Along this ridge to your right is where the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut were encamped.
All throughout November both Howe and Washington were scheming, tucking strategies and battle tactics up their sleeves that they hoped would provide them with a victory. Washington debated with his council whether or not to make a direct attack on Philadelphia again, but this was quickly put down by a majority of the group. The other option would be to wait for Howe to come to them so that they could overtake his army using the advantage of the hills with perfectly executed troop movements. While these discussions took place, spies were hearing reports of a secret march by Howe to capture Whitemarsh. He wrote, “In the course of last week, from a variety of intelligence I had reason to expect that General Howe was preparing to give us a general action.”
One of these intelligence sources proved very unlikely. Lydia Darragh, a resident of Philadelphia whose home was occupied by British soldiers, heard the signs of an upcoming attack by eavesdropping. Not wishing to see an American defeat, she made the bold and dangerous decision to travel past the British lines to warn Washington of Howe’s plans. Howe was coming, along with about 12,000 troops, the next morning. His objectives were clear-cut and simple: defeat Washington’s army for the final time before winter set in and, in doing so, seal his winning streak on a powerful note. This win would buy Howe fame and honor in England, for he intended to return to his home the following spring.
At around 10:00 p.m. on the evening of December 4th, the British began their journey out of Philadelphia’s safe quarters into the cold, dark night. They would begin their march by moving northward up York Road in the direction of the Continental army. During much of the Philadelphia campaign, Howe’s strategy consisted of three main columns: those led by Lt. General Charles Cornwallis, those under Lt. General Wilhelm von Knyphausen (consisting of mostly Hessian regiments), and those under Maj. General Charles Grey. Howe was fond of staging daring flanking maneuvers and loved to use these three groups in a series of distractions. By this time in the war, Washington had learned to anticipate Howe’s intricate battle designs, and planned to outthink him. These three columns would play important roles in the outcome of the Battle of Whitemarsh. As the British troops marched toward their destination, they were arranged in file as just indicated.
Upon reaching the Rising Sun Tavern, the same ground that Lydia Darragh had stood upon hours before, the British came into contact with American troops under the command of Captain Allen McLane. Here, the column swerved left onto Germantown Road to make their way toward Chestnut Hill, located across the Sandy Run Valley from Whitemarsh. As they continued the twelve-mile march, many of Howe’s soldiers were reliving memories as they passed by the houses and buildings that formed Germantown, including the Cliveden House, the epicenter of the Battle of Germantown—now a deserted wreckage. They continued up Germantown Road, passing the various German residences of the area including Beggarstown and Cresheim Village. All throughout the march, Continental pickets sniped at the enemy column from houses lining the road. Having once fired, these lone pickets would then proceed further up the road. In some cases, British troops would force their way into the houses to drive the Continentals out. The residents of these homes would a couple of days later suffer revenge from the British soldiers. Eventually, most of these sniping pickets would arrive back at camp to give firsthand warnings to Washington of the impending attack. Finally, after a long night of marching, the British troops were ordered to halt. The troops were now at Chestnut Hill, where they made their camp. General Howe established headquarters inside the house of Mathias Bush, at the intersection of Germantown Road and Bethlehem Pike. In choosing this intersection, positioned at two main roads, Howe made a smart tactical move, as it gave the British access to a route of escape or maneuvering. These headquarters also happened to be located at the crest of Chestnut Hill, giving the British their own vantage point paralleling the American’s elevated position two miles away. General Howe created a line of defense beyond the crest of the hill from the Wissahickon Creek on the left to modern day Wyndmoor on the right. Hessian Jägers would form the left flank of the line guarding the ascent of Germantown Road while the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Light Infantry would expand to the right, guarding Bethlehem Pike. The rest of the British force would spread out in a quadrangle to the rear in the Village of Chestnut Hill. Howe and his men would stay here for the next 36 hours before departure.
Meanwhile in the American camp, just before Howe’s men reached the top of Chestnut Hill, Washington had called the alarm to prepare for battle and instructed his troops to each build two campfires in order to scare the British into thinking that the size of their force was much larger than it actually was—a tactic he had used almost a year before in Trenton. When Howe’s army looked out upon the American camp, their eyes were swarmed with thousands of little reminders of the size and magnitude of the enemy army. The British, however, quickly saw through this mind trick and effectively made their camp along the hill.
Proceed to Chestnut Hill College at the intersection of Germantown Pike and Northwestern Ave. To get there, continue along the road of the State Park to Joshua Road and turn left. Proceed on Joshua Road to Germantown Pike and turn left. Proceed on Germantown Road until you get to the aforementioned intersection. (Along the way, note Church Road on your right as you pass through the community of Lafayette Hill. It is just up the street at St. Peter Lutheran Church where the Battle of Barren Hill occurred months later in May of 1778.) When you arrive at Chestnut Hill College stop in the small circle to your right across from the college.
Chestnut Hill and Germantown Section
Stop D: Chestnut Hill College (Refer to December 5 Map)
Park in the circle at the intersection of Germantown and Northwestern Avenues. across from Chestnut Hill College.
It seemed as though both Howe and Washington were waiting for each other to make the first move. Yet, around midday on December 5th, Washington sent two of his units under Sullivan in the direction of Chestnut Hill in order to gain information on the location and size of the British force. Sullivan ordered Brigadier General James Potter and his brigade of Pennsylvania militia and Connecticut regulars to move off of Militia Hill. Soon after, Sullivan also recruited Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Sherman to join Potter for this probe of Chestnut Hill. They were instructed to proceed along the Germantown Road as far as the Bush House, little knowing who presently occupied the residence. Sherman was frustrated with this order, as he had been told his regiment was to act independently of the other brigades. Yet his resistance did not last long, and he dutifully combined forces under Potter. The group made their way southward, turning left onto Germantown Road. As they proceeded, they would march close to Barren Hill and St. Peter’s Lutheran church, the location of a future battle that would take place in May of 1778. As the troops descended into the Wissahickon Creek Valley, they prepared themselves to discover the hidden details of the enemy they would engage over the next couple of days. All that they could tell at this point was that the enemy’s left flank was heavily covered by woods, with the Wissahickon in front of them. Sherman dispatched a small contingent to determine the exact location of the British position. After returning with the news of a large force with a firm grip on the area, Sherman and Potter decided to send about 60 men over the creek to test the enemy’s strength. Just as Sherman’s troops crossed, they were met by a unit of Anspach Jägers who countered their movement. Suddenly, a second wave of Hessians appeared, empowering the British line to fully dwarf the Americans. Upon retreat across the stream, the entire column fearfully turned around and made their way back in the direction of their camp. The Pennsylvania Militia would frequently fail and retreat in the face of experienced forces, indicating that their training was not up to par with many of the other American units. This would not be the last time this militia would turn tail and run, even though many had homes and family in the area now under threat of attack and other depredations.
Proceed to Phil-Mont Christian Academy at 35 Hillcrest Ave., Erdenheim, PA 19038. Continue up Germantown Ave. toward Chestnut Hill and turn left onto Hillcrest Ave. Continue on Hillcrest Ave. crossing both Stenton Ave. and Bethlehem Pike and then past the Academy down to the lower parking lot.
Stop D: Chestnut Hill College (Refer to December 5 Map)
Park in the circle at the intersection of Germantown and Northwestern Avenues. across from Chestnut Hill College.
It seemed as though both Howe and Washington were waiting for each other to make the first move. Yet, around midday on December 5th, Washington sent two of his units under Sullivan in the direction of Chestnut Hill in order to gain information on the location and size of the British force. Sullivan ordered Brigadier General James Potter and his brigade of Pennsylvania militia and Connecticut regulars to move off of Militia Hill. Soon after, Sullivan also recruited Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Sherman to join Potter for this probe of Chestnut Hill. They were instructed to proceed along the Germantown Road as far as the Bush House, little knowing who presently occupied the residence. Sherman was frustrated with this order, as he had been told his regiment was to act independently of the other brigades. Yet his resistance did not last long, and he dutifully combined forces under Potter. The group made their way southward, turning left onto Germantown Road. As they proceeded, they would march close to Barren Hill and St. Peter’s Lutheran church, the location of a future battle that would take place in May of 1778. As the troops descended into the Wissahickon Creek Valley, they prepared themselves to discover the hidden details of the enemy they would engage over the next couple of days. All that they could tell at this point was that the enemy’s left flank was heavily covered by woods, with the Wissahickon in front of them. Sherman dispatched a small contingent to determine the exact location of the British position. After returning with the news of a large force with a firm grip on the area, Sherman and Potter decided to send about 60 men over the creek to test the enemy’s strength. Just as Sherman’s troops crossed, they were met by a unit of Anspach Jägers who countered their movement. Suddenly, a second wave of Hessians appeared, empowering the British line to fully dwarf the Americans. Upon retreat across the stream, the entire column fearfully turned around and made their way back in the direction of their camp. The Pennsylvania Militia would frequently fail and retreat in the face of experienced forces, indicating that their training was not up to par with many of the other American units. This would not be the last time this militia would turn tail and run, even though many had homes and family in the area now under threat of attack and other depredations.
Proceed to Phil-Mont Christian Academy at 35 Hillcrest Ave., Erdenheim, PA 19038. Continue up Germantown Ave. toward Chestnut Hill and turn left onto Hillcrest Ave. Continue on Hillcrest Ave. crossing both Stenton Ave. and Bethlehem Pike and then past the Academy down to the lower parking lot.
Stop E: Phil-Mont Christian Academy (Refer to December 5 and December 6 Maps)
Walk to the far side of the tennis courts and look up and across Paper Mill Road. It is in this direction that the next Continental assault will take place.
At roughly the same time that Potter set out in the direction of Germantown Road with his troops, Brigadier General James Irvine, with the same mission as Potter, was dispatched from Militia Hill with about 600 men in four battalions. His trajectory ran parallel with current day Stenton Avenue but was coming from a different angle than Potter’s toward Chestnut Hill. This movement may have taken these troops through the present-day Morris Arboretum, or even farther to the left around the location of Phil-Mont. Before ascending Chestnut Hill in front of them, the troops crossed a bridge, over either the Wissahickon or Paper Mill Run. Irvine’s men, similar to Potter’s, were poorly trained without much experience. When Irvine was in the middle of dividing his men into smaller parties and ascending the hill to probe, they were interrupted by the British who came suddenly upon them. The British 1st Light Infantry Battalion led by Lt. Colonel Robert Abercromby came in a first wave. To provide support, the 2nd Battalion appeared when it seemed as though the Americans were surrounding their comrades. The British opened fire and quickly broke the American line, which began to fall apart as one by one, the Americans turned in retreat. General Irvine atop his tall horse and halfway up the hill bravely attempted to rally his men. Yet this was such a desperate retreat that even when Irvine himself was shot from the horse, not one soldier stopped to help him. Irvine lay on the ground with three fingers torn off and a serious head wound as well. These shameful actions of the American militiamen were noted by the British, who seemed to always remain cool and collected no matter what was going on around them. The desperate retreat of the militia was followed by a British bayonet charge which would have chased the Americans all the way back to Whitemarsh had Howe not called for their return to Chestnut Hill. Howe was not falling for what appeared to be Washington’s plan to draw the British army into the valley. Poor Irvine, along with twenty other militiamen, had been taken prisoner. There had been many more American casualties compared to the British.
Many of these retreating Continentals made their way back along the Bethlehem Pike where they set up camp some distance from the bulk of their army. That night, the British lit bonfires along the road to watch for any movement by the American forces back toward the British line. The major fighting on December 5th had come to an end, yet the troops sat waiting in their shelters for any sign of attack. Meanwhile, Howe sent small groups of men out onto Bethlehem Pike to test the American positions. The Flourtown Valley lay poised for a clash between the two sides.
Yet as December 6th dawned, no one stirred any further than they dared in the direction of the opposing camps. Howe was still staked out at the Bush House, and Washington held his breath along with his troops, his mind wandering in and out of the commitment to attack. Interestingly, Howe and Washington seemed to have similar plans regarding winning the battle. Howe wanted to pull Washington’s army from their safe bases out into the valley that encompassed Flourtown, and Washington was wary enough of this plan to warn his troops of it. Washington feared a flanking maneuver but was not sure which way it would turn. He hoped that all of his puzzle pieces would fit together to create his own victory over Howe, who knew that the Americans had a high chance of overwhelming him if he ventured too close to their precious hills. Drawing them out into the valley would be to Washington’s direct advantage, resulting in the much-needed victory he was hoping for.
However, nothing seemed to be changing for the entirety of December 6th. As opposed to full-scale conflicts, many skirmishes took place that day between mounted troops in the Flourtown Valley, but none had any great significance. Foraging parties were dispatched from Chestnut Hill and during the day British troops, especially the Hessians, committed punishable crimes against the people of Flourtown and the surrounding communities, stealing grain and livestock and even burning some houses. Yet, no major engagements occurred.
Howe was becoming impatient. He feared that if he waited any longer he would run out of time and supplies to make any significant mark on the Americans. The solution became increasingly obvious to Howe: a major flanking maneuver was begging to be a part of this engagement, and without much more thought, Howe began ordering preparations for the movement of his troops out of Chestnut Hill. He would come at the Americans from a new and improved angle, one he had not yet touched. Howe had set his eyes on the American left, near Edgehill.
Proceed to the Beggarstown School in the heart of Germantown along Germantown Ave. in Philadelphia. Out of Phil-Mont Christian Academy parking lot, turn left and proceed up to Paper Mill Road. Turn right onto Paper Mill Road and proceed to the light at the intersection of Paper Mill Road, Stenton Ave. and Bethlehem Pike. Turn left and then immediately bear to the right onto Bethlehem Pike continuing on to Germantown Ave. (Note on right--at the intersection of Bethlehem Pike and Germantown Ave.—is where the Matthias Bush House was located, where General Howe had his headquarters during the 5th and 6th.) Turn left onto Germantown Ave. and continue through Chestnut Hill, Mount Airy, and Germantown to the location of the Beggarstown School at 6669 Germantown Ave. Stop across the street from the building. (Note that you will have passed through the old village of Cresheim—around Allens Lane and Germantown Ave.—and are now in the area known then as Beggarstown or Bettelhausen.)
Walk to the far side of the tennis courts and look up and across Paper Mill Road. It is in this direction that the next Continental assault will take place.
At roughly the same time that Potter set out in the direction of Germantown Road with his troops, Brigadier General James Irvine, with the same mission as Potter, was dispatched from Militia Hill with about 600 men in four battalions. His trajectory ran parallel with current day Stenton Avenue but was coming from a different angle than Potter’s toward Chestnut Hill. This movement may have taken these troops through the present-day Morris Arboretum, or even farther to the left around the location of Phil-Mont. Before ascending Chestnut Hill in front of them, the troops crossed a bridge, over either the Wissahickon or Paper Mill Run. Irvine’s men, similar to Potter’s, were poorly trained without much experience. When Irvine was in the middle of dividing his men into smaller parties and ascending the hill to probe, they were interrupted by the British who came suddenly upon them. The British 1st Light Infantry Battalion led by Lt. Colonel Robert Abercromby came in a first wave. To provide support, the 2nd Battalion appeared when it seemed as though the Americans were surrounding their comrades. The British opened fire and quickly broke the American line, which began to fall apart as one by one, the Americans turned in retreat. General Irvine atop his tall horse and halfway up the hill bravely attempted to rally his men. Yet this was such a desperate retreat that even when Irvine himself was shot from the horse, not one soldier stopped to help him. Irvine lay on the ground with three fingers torn off and a serious head wound as well. These shameful actions of the American militiamen were noted by the British, who seemed to always remain cool and collected no matter what was going on around them. The desperate retreat of the militia was followed by a British bayonet charge which would have chased the Americans all the way back to Whitemarsh had Howe not called for their return to Chestnut Hill. Howe was not falling for what appeared to be Washington’s plan to draw the British army into the valley. Poor Irvine, along with twenty other militiamen, had been taken prisoner. There had been many more American casualties compared to the British.
Many of these retreating Continentals made their way back along the Bethlehem Pike where they set up camp some distance from the bulk of their army. That night, the British lit bonfires along the road to watch for any movement by the American forces back toward the British line. The major fighting on December 5th had come to an end, yet the troops sat waiting in their shelters for any sign of attack. Meanwhile, Howe sent small groups of men out onto Bethlehem Pike to test the American positions. The Flourtown Valley lay poised for a clash between the two sides.
Yet as December 6th dawned, no one stirred any further than they dared in the direction of the opposing camps. Howe was still staked out at the Bush House, and Washington held his breath along with his troops, his mind wandering in and out of the commitment to attack. Interestingly, Howe and Washington seemed to have similar plans regarding winning the battle. Howe wanted to pull Washington’s army from their safe bases out into the valley that encompassed Flourtown, and Washington was wary enough of this plan to warn his troops of it. Washington feared a flanking maneuver but was not sure which way it would turn. He hoped that all of his puzzle pieces would fit together to create his own victory over Howe, who knew that the Americans had a high chance of overwhelming him if he ventured too close to their precious hills. Drawing them out into the valley would be to Washington’s direct advantage, resulting in the much-needed victory he was hoping for.
However, nothing seemed to be changing for the entirety of December 6th. As opposed to full-scale conflicts, many skirmishes took place that day between mounted troops in the Flourtown Valley, but none had any great significance. Foraging parties were dispatched from Chestnut Hill and during the day British troops, especially the Hessians, committed punishable crimes against the people of Flourtown and the surrounding communities, stealing grain and livestock and even burning some houses. Yet, no major engagements occurred.
Howe was becoming impatient. He feared that if he waited any longer he would run out of time and supplies to make any significant mark on the Americans. The solution became increasingly obvious to Howe: a major flanking maneuver was begging to be a part of this engagement, and without much more thought, Howe began ordering preparations for the movement of his troops out of Chestnut Hill. He would come at the Americans from a new and improved angle, one he had not yet touched. Howe had set his eyes on the American left, near Edgehill.
Proceed to the Beggarstown School in the heart of Germantown along Germantown Ave. in Philadelphia. Out of Phil-Mont Christian Academy parking lot, turn left and proceed up to Paper Mill Road. Turn right onto Paper Mill Road and proceed to the light at the intersection of Paper Mill Road, Stenton Ave. and Bethlehem Pike. Turn left and then immediately bear to the right onto Bethlehem Pike continuing on to Germantown Ave. (Note on right--at the intersection of Bethlehem Pike and Germantown Ave.—is where the Matthias Bush House was located, where General Howe had his headquarters during the 5th and 6th.) Turn left onto Germantown Ave. and continue through Chestnut Hill, Mount Airy, and Germantown to the location of the Beggarstown School at 6669 Germantown Ave. Stop across the street from the building. (Note that you will have passed through the old village of Cresheim—around Allens Lane and Germantown Ave.—and are now in the area known then as Beggarstown or Bettelhausen.)
Stop F: Beggarstown School (Refer to December 6 and 7 Map)
Stop across from the Beggarstown School. The building is one of the few edifices remaining from the time period. Cliveden, the epicenter of the Battle of Germantown on October 4 is just up the street on the left.
Howe’s troops began exiting Chestnut Hill at around 1:00 in the morning on December 7. Many of the troops thought that they were heading back to Philadelphia, that the little excursion that they had taken over the past 48 hours was finished business. But of course, Howe had other plans and had not given up yet. Marching in their usual groups led by Cornwallis, then Knyphausen, and finally Grey, the army made its way back down Germantown Pike past the dark and worried houses. As partial punishment for the picketing mischief two nights prior, British soldiers set fire to these homes, illuminating the entire expanse of Beggarstown and Cresheim Village. The destruction of the area was so horrible that even many of the British struggled to watch. According to Captain Johann Ewald of the Field Jäger Corps,
The sight was horrible. The night was very dark. The blazing flames spread about with all swiftness and the wind blew violently. The cries of human voices of the young and old, who had seen their belongings consumed by the flames without saying anything, put everyone in a melancholy mood.
The march continued, however, pushing through the chaos that had just been created.
When Howe turned the British column left off of Germantown Road onto the Abington Road, (present day Washington Lane), the previously unsuspecting troops were immediately aware that this march was not a trip back to the relative comfort of Philadelphia, but a flanking maneuver to the Continental left. Cornwallis and Knyphausen had taken the lead, and Grey and his column marched as a caboose.
By very early morning of December 7th, the British had traveled several miles up Abington Road. Having now arrived at the intersection of Church Road, Cornwallis and Knyphausen would continue on to Jenkintown and Abington, but Grey, bringing up the rear along with about 2,000 men, would turn left and depart from the main column. Soon Church Road led Grey to Limekiln Pike, where the column had been instructed by Howe to wait until it heard signs of fighting or were given the word to proceed. Once they had the indication to make a move, Grey was to take his troops up Limekiln Pike in the direction of a place called Tyson’s Tavern, located at the intersection of Limekiln Pike, Jenkintown Road and Fitzwatertown Road - (as best as can be determined from a map created by Captain John Andre of the British Army at the time) - where they would drive out a Continental picket position and come within a very short distance of Camp Hill. Grey, more than likely, was being used as a feint as Knyphausen and Cornwallis moved further north. At the moment though, the men were staked out just before the intersection of Church Road and Limekiln Pike, not far from present day Arcadia University. Grey was playing an important role in Howe’s master plan. He was to act as a distraction for Washington’s army as the main British column was making its way even further to the left of the Continental line. Grey would engage the Americans up ahead in order for Howe to launch his surprise attack.
Next on Howe’s plan was to file off the main column under Knyphausen at Jenkintown Road, where it would proceed in the direction of Edge Hill. Cornwallis continued on to York Road and then proceeded to the intersection of Susquehanna Road. The purpose of separating these two columns was probably to ensure that the British would cover a large expanse of space, spanning the entire distance of Edge Hill, but also to gain control of the three major roads heading toward the Continental left. Knyphausen’s and Cornwallis’ lines would eventually reform in front of Edge Hill as the height faced both Jenkintown Road and modern Easton Road.
Proceed to Laverock in Glenside. Continue on Germantown and then left onto Washington Lane, then known as the Abington Road. Proceed on Washington Lane to Church Road—past Cheltenham Ave. Turn left onto Church and then right onto Limekiln near Arcadia University. Proceed on Limekiln and turn left onto Waverly Road. As you approach Waverly Road along Limekiln, you will be following the route of Grey’s column just before they engaged the Continentals to your left. Continue to the small circle at the intersection of Laverock, Beaver and Fox just past Waverly’s turn to the left.
Stop across from the Beggarstown School. The building is one of the few edifices remaining from the time period. Cliveden, the epicenter of the Battle of Germantown on October 4 is just up the street on the left.
Howe’s troops began exiting Chestnut Hill at around 1:00 in the morning on December 7. Many of the troops thought that they were heading back to Philadelphia, that the little excursion that they had taken over the past 48 hours was finished business. But of course, Howe had other plans and had not given up yet. Marching in their usual groups led by Cornwallis, then Knyphausen, and finally Grey, the army made its way back down Germantown Pike past the dark and worried houses. As partial punishment for the picketing mischief two nights prior, British soldiers set fire to these homes, illuminating the entire expanse of Beggarstown and Cresheim Village. The destruction of the area was so horrible that even many of the British struggled to watch. According to Captain Johann Ewald of the Field Jäger Corps,
The sight was horrible. The night was very dark. The blazing flames spread about with all swiftness and the wind blew violently. The cries of human voices of the young and old, who had seen their belongings consumed by the flames without saying anything, put everyone in a melancholy mood.
The march continued, however, pushing through the chaos that had just been created.
When Howe turned the British column left off of Germantown Road onto the Abington Road, (present day Washington Lane), the previously unsuspecting troops were immediately aware that this march was not a trip back to the relative comfort of Philadelphia, but a flanking maneuver to the Continental left. Cornwallis and Knyphausen had taken the lead, and Grey and his column marched as a caboose.
By very early morning of December 7th, the British had traveled several miles up Abington Road. Having now arrived at the intersection of Church Road, Cornwallis and Knyphausen would continue on to Jenkintown and Abington, but Grey, bringing up the rear along with about 2,000 men, would turn left and depart from the main column. Soon Church Road led Grey to Limekiln Pike, where the column had been instructed by Howe to wait until it heard signs of fighting or were given the word to proceed. Once they had the indication to make a move, Grey was to take his troops up Limekiln Pike in the direction of a place called Tyson’s Tavern, located at the intersection of Limekiln Pike, Jenkintown Road and Fitzwatertown Road - (as best as can be determined from a map created by Captain John Andre of the British Army at the time) - where they would drive out a Continental picket position and come within a very short distance of Camp Hill. Grey, more than likely, was being used as a feint as Knyphausen and Cornwallis moved further north. At the moment though, the men were staked out just before the intersection of Church Road and Limekiln Pike, not far from present day Arcadia University. Grey was playing an important role in Howe’s master plan. He was to act as a distraction for Washington’s army as the main British column was making its way even further to the left of the Continental line. Grey would engage the Americans up ahead in order for Howe to launch his surprise attack.
Next on Howe’s plan was to file off the main column under Knyphausen at Jenkintown Road, where it would proceed in the direction of Edge Hill. Cornwallis continued on to York Road and then proceeded to the intersection of Susquehanna Road. The purpose of separating these two columns was probably to ensure that the British would cover a large expanse of space, spanning the entire distance of Edge Hill, but also to gain control of the three major roads heading toward the Continental left. Knyphausen’s and Cornwallis’ lines would eventually reform in front of Edge Hill as the height faced both Jenkintown Road and modern Easton Road.
Proceed to Laverock in Glenside. Continue on Germantown and then left onto Washington Lane, then known as the Abington Road. Proceed on Washington Lane to Church Road—past Cheltenham Ave. Turn left onto Church and then right onto Limekiln near Arcadia University. Proceed on Limekiln and turn left onto Waverly Road. As you approach Waverly Road along Limekiln, you will be following the route of Grey’s column just before they engaged the Continentals to your left. Continue to the small circle at the intersection of Laverock, Beaver and Fox just past Waverly’s turn to the left.
Edge Hill Section
Stop G: Laverock (Refer to December 7 Morning Map)
Although the skirmish which occurred in this area was somewhat widespread, this intersection marks the center of the fighting commonly referred to as the Skirmish of Waverly Heights.
Meanwhile, over in the Continental camp, the British departure from Chestnut Hill had not gone unnoticed. Scouts began providing snippets of intelligence to Washington, only able to inform him that the British were probably on the move. Around 10:00 in the morning, Washington sent Potter’s brigade of the Pennsylvania Militia as well as Samuel Webb’s 2nd Connecticut Regulars, commanded by Sherman, back toward the Bush House to see what was going on. When they arrived, the angry town inhabitants told them of the direction and manner of the British departure. The Continental units began traveling back to Militia Hill but were quickly redirected in the direction of Tyson’s Tavern, where they were ordered to attack the rear of the left flank of the British column. Tyson’s Tavern was most likely located at the crossing of Limekiln Pike and Jenkintown Road, and this intersection would provide both a good spot to see the British movement near Edge Hill as well as the perfect placement to block the British from advancing onto Camp Hill. The Americans dutifully made their way through Springfield Township, each moment moving unknowingly closer to Grey’s column.
While this was taking place, Washington was in the midst of administering quick directions of movements to his troops. He ordered Daniel Morgan’s and Mordecai Gist’s Maryland Militia to move off of Camp Hill onto Susquehanna Road in the direction of Edgehill, where Cornwallis and Knyphausen were also headed, but from the opposite direction. The two sides were on a collision course.
At about 11:30 a.m., Grey, having not yet heard any fighting to his right or received orders to march, had become increasingly impatient to move his men. Ignoring orders, he began sending his troops onto Limekiln Pike in the direction of Tyson’s Tavern. At that moment, the Americans under Potter, Sherman, and Webb were just reaching the crest of Edge Hill, not far from a location called Waverly Heights. These Americans were the first to realize that the British were a mere mile away. They immediately descended the hill and began organizing their men into lines around the area of Thomas Wharton’s estate, known as Twickenham. Upon approaching the area, Grey became concerned about the heavily forested area on both sides of the road. His concern was that snipers could be using the woods for cover. His apprehension was not unfounded. He quickly ordered four lines of Light Infantry and Jägers to fan out on either side of the road and proceed through the area. Almost immediately, Grey’s men began receiving fire from the woods to their left. These were advanced troops connected to the units massing near Twickenham. The two British units to the left surged forward to aggressively engage their enemy: the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut. The Connecticut regiment put up a valiant fight in contrast to the militia, which began to falter not long after facing the enemy. The British obviously had their adversaries outnumbered, but their aggressiveness and good training would simply overwhelm the Continentals at this moment. The outcome of this encounter was also determined by Grey’s decision to surround the Americans using a flanking maneuver on the Continentals’ left with one of the other units he had but moments before dispatched. This worked well. As the initial two units plowed forward, facing the Americans head on, the other moved quickly to their backs and pounced in for a quick surprise. At this point the Pennsylvania Militia had already begun their anticipated retreat toward the crest of Edge Hill in the direction of Camp Hill, while the remaining Connecticut troops struggled but also managed to disentangle themselves from the fight, ultimately retreating in the same direction as their comrades, leaving the British wondering what was next.
These two sides were not done with each other, however. The Continentals started to regroup, this time under the feeble leadership of Colonel Joseph Reed, who had taken control from Sherman without permission. The drama that followed among the ranks of the Continentals involved Sherman’s fuming anger at the man who had “stolen” his troops out from under him. Potter and Reed now planned to make some minor flanking maneuvers on the British to regain ground and morale, but the orders were confused and demoralizing to the troops, especially the Connecticut units which were infuriated with the lack of adequate leadership and cowardliness of the militia. The fight now re-engaged with the bulk of the Continental force facing increased units being sent forward by Grey. The fighting occurred in heavy forest and underbrush, making it difficult to see ahead but a few yards. There was now close quarter combat between the two sides. Before the Americans could make any progress, Reed’s horse was shot from underneath him, and the man was thrown on the ground to face almost certain death or capture by oncoming, bayonet-bearing soldiers. Just in time, a captain by the name of Allen McLane heroically swooped in to aid the failing Continentals, as one of his dragoons rushed to carry Reed away from his near doom. Even after McLane’s aid, though, the Americans were still driven back and forced to retreat, this time over the crest of the hill all the way back to Camp Hill. Following the rout of the Continental forces, Grey and his men ascended to the crest of Edge Hill, looking off to Camp Hill in the distance. Grey continued with part of his column to the area of Tyson’s Gap. In the end, Grey’s column extended from the southeast corner of present day Cheltenham Township, near Willow Grove Avenue and Cheltenham Avenue all the way to Tyson’s Gap at present day Ardsley.
Proceed to Edge Hill Crest, to the grave marker along Fernhill Road in Abington. In order to get there, continue on Laverock to your left out to Church Road, noting the remains of Twickenham on your left, Thomas Wharton’s estate. Turn right onto Church Road and then right onto Station Ave. at the bottom of the hill. Station Avenue becomes North Hills Ave. Proceed on North Hills to Fitzwatertown and turn right. Follow to Susquehanna and turn right onto Susquehanna. Continue on Susquehanna and turn right onto Edge Hill Road—at top of the hill past Easton Road. Proceed on Edge Hill Road a short distance and turn left onto Easton and then an immediate right onto Bradfield (alongside Burger King) and then immediately left onto Fernhill. (From first starting on Susquehanna, this was the route of Morgan’s Rifles and Gist’s Maryland Militia as they approached Edge Hill as described below.) Proceed on Fernhill a short distance to a residence just before Fernhill bears to the right and intersects with Roslyn Ave. Watch for a small grave marker next to the sidewalk on your right.
Stop G: Laverock (Refer to December 7 Morning Map)
Although the skirmish which occurred in this area was somewhat widespread, this intersection marks the center of the fighting commonly referred to as the Skirmish of Waverly Heights.
Meanwhile, over in the Continental camp, the British departure from Chestnut Hill had not gone unnoticed. Scouts began providing snippets of intelligence to Washington, only able to inform him that the British were probably on the move. Around 10:00 in the morning, Washington sent Potter’s brigade of the Pennsylvania Militia as well as Samuel Webb’s 2nd Connecticut Regulars, commanded by Sherman, back toward the Bush House to see what was going on. When they arrived, the angry town inhabitants told them of the direction and manner of the British departure. The Continental units began traveling back to Militia Hill but were quickly redirected in the direction of Tyson’s Tavern, where they were ordered to attack the rear of the left flank of the British column. Tyson’s Tavern was most likely located at the crossing of Limekiln Pike and Jenkintown Road, and this intersection would provide both a good spot to see the British movement near Edge Hill as well as the perfect placement to block the British from advancing onto Camp Hill. The Americans dutifully made their way through Springfield Township, each moment moving unknowingly closer to Grey’s column.
While this was taking place, Washington was in the midst of administering quick directions of movements to his troops. He ordered Daniel Morgan’s and Mordecai Gist’s Maryland Militia to move off of Camp Hill onto Susquehanna Road in the direction of Edgehill, where Cornwallis and Knyphausen were also headed, but from the opposite direction. The two sides were on a collision course.
At about 11:30 a.m., Grey, having not yet heard any fighting to his right or received orders to march, had become increasingly impatient to move his men. Ignoring orders, he began sending his troops onto Limekiln Pike in the direction of Tyson’s Tavern. At that moment, the Americans under Potter, Sherman, and Webb were just reaching the crest of Edge Hill, not far from a location called Waverly Heights. These Americans were the first to realize that the British were a mere mile away. They immediately descended the hill and began organizing their men into lines around the area of Thomas Wharton’s estate, known as Twickenham. Upon approaching the area, Grey became concerned about the heavily forested area on both sides of the road. His concern was that snipers could be using the woods for cover. His apprehension was not unfounded. He quickly ordered four lines of Light Infantry and Jägers to fan out on either side of the road and proceed through the area. Almost immediately, Grey’s men began receiving fire from the woods to their left. These were advanced troops connected to the units massing near Twickenham. The two British units to the left surged forward to aggressively engage their enemy: the Pennsylvania Militia and 2nd Connecticut. The Connecticut regiment put up a valiant fight in contrast to the militia, which began to falter not long after facing the enemy. The British obviously had their adversaries outnumbered, but their aggressiveness and good training would simply overwhelm the Continentals at this moment. The outcome of this encounter was also determined by Grey’s decision to surround the Americans using a flanking maneuver on the Continentals’ left with one of the other units he had but moments before dispatched. This worked well. As the initial two units plowed forward, facing the Americans head on, the other moved quickly to their backs and pounced in for a quick surprise. At this point the Pennsylvania Militia had already begun their anticipated retreat toward the crest of Edge Hill in the direction of Camp Hill, while the remaining Connecticut troops struggled but also managed to disentangle themselves from the fight, ultimately retreating in the same direction as their comrades, leaving the British wondering what was next.
These two sides were not done with each other, however. The Continentals started to regroup, this time under the feeble leadership of Colonel Joseph Reed, who had taken control from Sherman without permission. The drama that followed among the ranks of the Continentals involved Sherman’s fuming anger at the man who had “stolen” his troops out from under him. Potter and Reed now planned to make some minor flanking maneuvers on the British to regain ground and morale, but the orders were confused and demoralizing to the troops, especially the Connecticut units which were infuriated with the lack of adequate leadership and cowardliness of the militia. The fight now re-engaged with the bulk of the Continental force facing increased units being sent forward by Grey. The fighting occurred in heavy forest and underbrush, making it difficult to see ahead but a few yards. There was now close quarter combat between the two sides. Before the Americans could make any progress, Reed’s horse was shot from underneath him, and the man was thrown on the ground to face almost certain death or capture by oncoming, bayonet-bearing soldiers. Just in time, a captain by the name of Allen McLane heroically swooped in to aid the failing Continentals, as one of his dragoons rushed to carry Reed away from his near doom. Even after McLane’s aid, though, the Americans were still driven back and forced to retreat, this time over the crest of the hill all the way back to Camp Hill. Following the rout of the Continental forces, Grey and his men ascended to the crest of Edge Hill, looking off to Camp Hill in the distance. Grey continued with part of his column to the area of Tyson’s Gap. In the end, Grey’s column extended from the southeast corner of present day Cheltenham Township, near Willow Grove Avenue and Cheltenham Avenue all the way to Tyson’s Gap at present day Ardsley.
Proceed to Edge Hill Crest, to the grave marker along Fernhill Road in Abington. In order to get there, continue on Laverock to your left out to Church Road, noting the remains of Twickenham on your left, Thomas Wharton’s estate. Turn right onto Church Road and then right onto Station Ave. at the bottom of the hill. Station Avenue becomes North Hills Ave. Proceed on North Hills to Fitzwatertown and turn right. Follow to Susquehanna and turn right onto Susquehanna. Continue on Susquehanna and turn right onto Edge Hill Road—at top of the hill past Easton Road. Proceed on Edge Hill Road a short distance and turn left onto Easton and then an immediate right onto Bradfield (alongside Burger King) and then immediately left onto Fernhill. (From first starting on Susquehanna, this was the route of Morgan’s Rifles and Gist’s Maryland Militia as they approached Edge Hill as described below.) Proceed on Fernhill a short distance to a residence just before Fernhill bears to the right and intersects with Roslyn Ave. Watch for a small grave marker next to the sidewalk on your right.
Stop H: Edge Hill Crest / Fernhill Road - Grave Marker (Refer to December 7 Afternoon Map)
Stop next to the grave marker alongside the road to continue the narrative.
The narrative of the fighting at Edge Hill has been recounted by various historians from the 19th century to the present, many of which differ from each other. As with the fighting at Waverly Heights, most have been put together through bits and pieces of information from both British and American participants in the fight. What follows is a compilation of these stories as best as could be rendered.
Not long after the initial contact between Grey and the Continentals, Howe and the two main columns engaged with Morgan and Gist near the American left at the crest of Edge Hill, the highest point in the area. This was a couple miles east of Grey’s encounter. After coming up Jenkintown and Susquehanna Roads, Knyphausen and Cornwallis had met to form a single line that stretched from just beyond Susquehanna Road to near Tyson’s Gap, present day Ardsley. The British line was reinforced by Grey when he was finished with Potter’s troops and had taken full control from Limekiln Pike to Jenkintown Road. Morgan’s Riflemen and the Maryland Militia had come down Susquehanna Road, about as far as the Elias Kirk farm at present day Hillside Cemetery. Here, they turned right to move parallel to Edge Hill above them. Then they began moving up the north slope in the direction of the oncoming British troops. Before reaching its crest, the Americans were hit with a jolting wave of the British 1st Light Infantry under Abercromby which had just come over the hilltop. While Morgan’s men initially drove these British back down the other side of the hill, they were met with a second wave of Cornwallis' men, the 33rd Regiment of Foot, Cornwallis' personal command and one of the top units in the British Army. Reinforced by these crack soldiers, the 1st Light Infantry was turned around and forced toward the hill once again. It was reported that the 1st Light Infantry had imbibed too much rum as they had rested earlier before their initial ascent of Edge Hill and that many were drunk. In any case, Abercromby was displeased and disappointed in his men’s performance.
Gist’s Maryland Militia filed off to Morgan’s right along the crest of the hill. All along the ridge, they dug trenches and pits to create some sort of defense against the encroaching forces below. A desperate fight now developed without much movement one way or the other. Morgan’s troops, at the other end of the ridge, fought “Indian style,” using the rocks and trees as cover. The British were firing cannons toward the Continental forces on the hill, but without much effect. Based on the finding of numerous cannon balls in various locations in the years following the fighting, it is conjectured that at Edge Hill, they were either flying over the top of the ridge onto the Kirk farm or bouncing off of splintering trees. Morgan and Gist soon faced the growing threat of being surrounded because the British line was so long and their numbers proved very overwhelming. Over to the American right, Gist’s Maryland Militia faced a ferocious uphill bayonet charge by Abercromby’s unit which had recovered from its previous indignity. After being driven back, the Marylanders were able to reform and push them back. The battle continued to rage, and the fighting endured well into mid-afternoon. Morgan and the Marylanders were holding their own against a superior force—both in numbers and capability. Yet they continued to hold the hill!
Washington could see some of what was occurring from his high vantage point on Camp Hill. Yet not much was clear to him regarding Morgan’s position and predicament. As he rode along the line of the main camp, he discussed with some of his subordinates whether Morgan should be reinforced. Timothy Pickering, one of Washington’s officers said to him,
If a small reinforcement be sent, they must soon give way; if a large force be detached, a great breach will be made in the line of defence, and this body also will not be able long to maintain their ground; and if they should retreat in disorder, the whole line may be thrown into confusion.
Washington conceded the point. This decision left Morgan’s men and the Maryland Militia in a tough situation. They were left to fight alone.
Late in the afternoon, around 4:00 by some accounts, Howe decided to move against the Continental center and left on Camp Hill using three powerful lines. His purpose was to test these spots for a weakness. Abercromby led the first wave with the 44th Regiment and some Light Infantry. Behind him was a line of British Grenadiers followed by a line of Hessians commanded by Brigadier General William Erskine. Howe had pulled some of the Hessian troops from the line facing Edge Hill to complete this force, indicating that the defense on the hill was beginning to falter. Their general direction was probably along the Susquehanna Road but possibly along Jenkintown. Once having approached Camp Hill and seeing the strength of the American position, they were forced to pull back. In any case, this move indicated that Morgan and the Marylanders had finally been forced off of Edge Hill.
In regard to Morgan’s retreat, with the waves of British forces approaching Edge Hill and the exhaustion of the Continental troops, not to mention the attrition that had been taking place, the latter were simply overwhelmed. Morgan grudgingly pulled his men back in retreat first to Heston Farm at the base of Edge Hill along Susquehanna Road, across from Kirk Farm. From here, Morgan and the Marylanders would make a tactical retreat back to Camp Hill, stopping and firing at the pursuing British forces. Though some of the British pursued the Americans past Tyson’s Tavern and even to the base of the main Continental position, it became clear that the Americans had slipped safely out of Howe’s reach, at least for a time. Except for the dead and wounded exacted by the British assault, the Americans had returned to Camp Hill, leaving Howe empty-handed. Morgan’s men had fought well; even the British admitted this. In the words of Captain Johann Ewald of a British corps of Hessians:
His [Morgan´s] scheme could have succeeded if our center had not, by chance, lagged behind. But whether he would have wiped us out completely, that was the question! For the Corps was nearly a thousand men strong.
He added:
For a Jäger Corps which is well trained and knows how to fight advantageously dispersed …. Is comparable to a swarm of bees when they attack a spirited animal, which, tormented and bitten into madness, stung even harder from all sides, must finally succumb.
Proceed to the Fairhill Shopping Center past the Thomas Fitzwater home. Continue on Fernhill Rd. and immediately onto Roslyn Ave. Watch for wooden stairs along the left side of the street. (You can walk up between these residences to Abington Woods. Abington Woods is the only area left relatively undeveloped since the time of the battle. The area may also be accessed from below at the intersection of Kelly Ln. and Pleasant Ave.) Continue on Roslyn and left on Ardsley, right on Roberts and right onto Jenkintown Rd. Proceed past Tyson’s Gap (Ardsley) and the Tyson’s Tavern location, continuing past the Thomas Fitzwater Home just before Twining Road. (Jenkintown Road merges with Limekiln at the intersection of the two.) Continue across Twining and pull into the Fairway Shopping Center on your right.
Stop next to the grave marker alongside the road to continue the narrative.
The narrative of the fighting at Edge Hill has been recounted by various historians from the 19th century to the present, many of which differ from each other. As with the fighting at Waverly Heights, most have been put together through bits and pieces of information from both British and American participants in the fight. What follows is a compilation of these stories as best as could be rendered.
Not long after the initial contact between Grey and the Continentals, Howe and the two main columns engaged with Morgan and Gist near the American left at the crest of Edge Hill, the highest point in the area. This was a couple miles east of Grey’s encounter. After coming up Jenkintown and Susquehanna Roads, Knyphausen and Cornwallis had met to form a single line that stretched from just beyond Susquehanna Road to near Tyson’s Gap, present day Ardsley. The British line was reinforced by Grey when he was finished with Potter’s troops and had taken full control from Limekiln Pike to Jenkintown Road. Morgan’s Riflemen and the Maryland Militia had come down Susquehanna Road, about as far as the Elias Kirk farm at present day Hillside Cemetery. Here, they turned right to move parallel to Edge Hill above them. Then they began moving up the north slope in the direction of the oncoming British troops. Before reaching its crest, the Americans were hit with a jolting wave of the British 1st Light Infantry under Abercromby which had just come over the hilltop. While Morgan’s men initially drove these British back down the other side of the hill, they were met with a second wave of Cornwallis' men, the 33rd Regiment of Foot, Cornwallis' personal command and one of the top units in the British Army. Reinforced by these crack soldiers, the 1st Light Infantry was turned around and forced toward the hill once again. It was reported that the 1st Light Infantry had imbibed too much rum as they had rested earlier before their initial ascent of Edge Hill and that many were drunk. In any case, Abercromby was displeased and disappointed in his men’s performance.
Gist’s Maryland Militia filed off to Morgan’s right along the crest of the hill. All along the ridge, they dug trenches and pits to create some sort of defense against the encroaching forces below. A desperate fight now developed without much movement one way or the other. Morgan’s troops, at the other end of the ridge, fought “Indian style,” using the rocks and trees as cover. The British were firing cannons toward the Continental forces on the hill, but without much effect. Based on the finding of numerous cannon balls in various locations in the years following the fighting, it is conjectured that at Edge Hill, they were either flying over the top of the ridge onto the Kirk farm or bouncing off of splintering trees. Morgan and Gist soon faced the growing threat of being surrounded because the British line was so long and their numbers proved very overwhelming. Over to the American right, Gist’s Maryland Militia faced a ferocious uphill bayonet charge by Abercromby’s unit which had recovered from its previous indignity. After being driven back, the Marylanders were able to reform and push them back. The battle continued to rage, and the fighting endured well into mid-afternoon. Morgan and the Marylanders were holding their own against a superior force—both in numbers and capability. Yet they continued to hold the hill!
Washington could see some of what was occurring from his high vantage point on Camp Hill. Yet not much was clear to him regarding Morgan’s position and predicament. As he rode along the line of the main camp, he discussed with some of his subordinates whether Morgan should be reinforced. Timothy Pickering, one of Washington’s officers said to him,
If a small reinforcement be sent, they must soon give way; if a large force be detached, a great breach will be made in the line of defence, and this body also will not be able long to maintain their ground; and if they should retreat in disorder, the whole line may be thrown into confusion.
Washington conceded the point. This decision left Morgan’s men and the Maryland Militia in a tough situation. They were left to fight alone.
Late in the afternoon, around 4:00 by some accounts, Howe decided to move against the Continental center and left on Camp Hill using three powerful lines. His purpose was to test these spots for a weakness. Abercromby led the first wave with the 44th Regiment and some Light Infantry. Behind him was a line of British Grenadiers followed by a line of Hessians commanded by Brigadier General William Erskine. Howe had pulled some of the Hessian troops from the line facing Edge Hill to complete this force, indicating that the defense on the hill was beginning to falter. Their general direction was probably along the Susquehanna Road but possibly along Jenkintown. Once having approached Camp Hill and seeing the strength of the American position, they were forced to pull back. In any case, this move indicated that Morgan and the Marylanders had finally been forced off of Edge Hill.
In regard to Morgan’s retreat, with the waves of British forces approaching Edge Hill and the exhaustion of the Continental troops, not to mention the attrition that had been taking place, the latter were simply overwhelmed. Morgan grudgingly pulled his men back in retreat first to Heston Farm at the base of Edge Hill along Susquehanna Road, across from Kirk Farm. From here, Morgan and the Marylanders would make a tactical retreat back to Camp Hill, stopping and firing at the pursuing British forces. Though some of the British pursued the Americans past Tyson’s Tavern and even to the base of the main Continental position, it became clear that the Americans had slipped safely out of Howe’s reach, at least for a time. Except for the dead and wounded exacted by the British assault, the Americans had returned to Camp Hill, leaving Howe empty-handed. Morgan’s men had fought well; even the British admitted this. In the words of Captain Johann Ewald of a British corps of Hessians:
His [Morgan´s] scheme could have succeeded if our center had not, by chance, lagged behind. But whether he would have wiped us out completely, that was the question! For the Corps was nearly a thousand men strong.
He added:
For a Jäger Corps which is well trained and knows how to fight advantageously dispersed …. Is comparable to a swarm of bees when they attack a spirited animal, which, tormented and bitten into madness, stung even harder from all sides, must finally succumb.
Proceed to the Fairhill Shopping Center past the Thomas Fitzwater home. Continue on Fernhill Rd. and immediately onto Roslyn Ave. Watch for wooden stairs along the left side of the street. (You can walk up between these residences to Abington Woods. Abington Woods is the only area left relatively undeveloped since the time of the battle. The area may also be accessed from below at the intersection of Kelly Ln. and Pleasant Ave.) Continue on Roslyn and left on Ardsley, right on Roberts and right onto Jenkintown Rd. Proceed past Tyson’s Gap (Ardsley) and the Tyson’s Tavern location, continuing past the Thomas Fitzwater Home just before Twining Road. (Jenkintown Road merges with Limekiln at the intersection of the two.) Continue across Twining and pull into the Fairway Shopping Center on your right.
Stop I (Stop A - Part 2): Fairway Shopping Center (Refer to December 7 Afternoon Map)
From this site, one can consider the position that the Continental forces held atop Camp Hill across and above Limekiln Pike.
With the fighting now temporarily over, General Howe, with some subordinate officers, approached the American line at the base of Camp Hill crossing Sandy Run Creek just past the Thomas Fitzwater house. He had ridden to the spot in order to truly understand the American position. As he considered the height above, swarming with well dug in troops behind abatis as well as cannons, he was forced to make an important decision. Should he try to attack the Continental main line or not? Howe would set up camp on Edge Hill that evening and wait for the morning to come before attempting any more probes at Washington’s defense. That night, some of Morgan’s brave men left their shelters and moved close to the British camp, close enough to hear them talking. Morgan’s men soon quit spying and made their way back to their own hill.
The same night, Howe became increasingly uncomfortable with his situation. He was worried about making a direct attack on Washington’s main position. As Friedrich von Muenchhausen, one of Howe’s subordinates recalled, Howe “found everywhere strong natural and manmade obstacles, which prevented any hope of success.” Washington’s position was seemingly impregnable and unless he himself decided to come down from the height to fight, there was little Howe could do. In addition, the British food supply, only meant for a couple of days, was running out. His army was tired, longing for the comforts associated with Philadelphia. He was finished with traveling and camping. Unbeknownst to Washington and his troops, Howe was preparing to remove himself from the area.
Proceed to the North Penn VFW. Cross Limekiln Pike from the parking lot and proceed down Martin Lane to the cul-de-sac to turn around. As you drive on Martin, consider the perspective that Howe had as he contemplated Washington’s position on Camp Hill above. Reverse your route through Tyson’s Gap and proceed to North Penn VFW on your left just past Tyson Ave. Drive up to the flagpole in front of the building.
From this site, one can consider the position that the Continental forces held atop Camp Hill across and above Limekiln Pike.
With the fighting now temporarily over, General Howe, with some subordinate officers, approached the American line at the base of Camp Hill crossing Sandy Run Creek just past the Thomas Fitzwater house. He had ridden to the spot in order to truly understand the American position. As he considered the height above, swarming with well dug in troops behind abatis as well as cannons, he was forced to make an important decision. Should he try to attack the Continental main line or not? Howe would set up camp on Edge Hill that evening and wait for the morning to come before attempting any more probes at Washington’s defense. That night, some of Morgan’s brave men left their shelters and moved close to the British camp, close enough to hear them talking. Morgan’s men soon quit spying and made their way back to their own hill.
The same night, Howe became increasingly uncomfortable with his situation. He was worried about making a direct attack on Washington’s main position. As Friedrich von Muenchhausen, one of Howe’s subordinates recalled, Howe “found everywhere strong natural and manmade obstacles, which prevented any hope of success.” Washington’s position was seemingly impregnable and unless he himself decided to come down from the height to fight, there was little Howe could do. In addition, the British food supply, only meant for a couple of days, was running out. His army was tired, longing for the comforts associated with Philadelphia. He was finished with traveling and camping. Unbeknownst to Washington and his troops, Howe was preparing to remove himself from the area.
Proceed to the North Penn VFW. Cross Limekiln Pike from the parking lot and proceed down Martin Lane to the cul-de-sac to turn around. As you drive on Martin, consider the perspective that Howe had as he contemplated Washington’s position on Camp Hill above. Reverse your route through Tyson’s Gap and proceed to North Penn VFW on your left just past Tyson Ave. Drive up to the flagpole in front of the building.
Stop B - Part 2: North Penn VFW
We now depart for a brief spell from the narrative to consider the four markers at the base of the flagpole before you. In 1855, a Mr. Russell Smith purchased a piece of land alongside the south face of Edgehill, not far from this spot, where much of the fighting on December 7 had taken place. In 1861 his daughter, Mary, while playing in the woods, found a relic of the battle: a bayonet. After further investigation by the family, more artifacts were uncovered as well as the remains of four unidentified bodies. It was determined that these were Continental soldiers who died during the fighting and were buried, together, near where they died. Here they reposed for almost another hundred years. In 1953, however, Xanthus Smith, Russell Smith’s grandson, allowed the bodies to be exhumed and moved to their present location. The re-interment took place on Memorial Day of the same year.
As one contemplates the final resting place of these four unknown soldiers, it is perhaps appropriate to consider the terrible toll of war, including the one under consideration. The devastation brought by the conflict to the area is in many ways incalculable. Both sides required supplies to carry on, but nothing compared to the depredations carried out by the British and Hessian forces while roaming the area. Personal property was despoiled, including crops and livestock on farms. In some cases, residents of the area were personally assaulted. Houses were burned with total disregard for the innocent. Families were displaced and forced out into the cold of winter with no provisions to sustain them. Hardest hit were the residences along Germantown Road. At war’s end, the American government was submitted with various claims by people from these neighborhoods. The following is but a sampling: Julius Kerper - £1,750, Henry Cress - £1,275, Wigard Miller - £680, Mathias Bush - £640, John Biddis - £625, Christopher Yeakel - £290, William Ottinger - £138, and the list goes on. Even the house of Mathias Bush was pillaged while General Howe made his temporary residence there (see biographies under Bush). Of course, no one can calculate the psychological trauma suffered by those who were victimized during this episode. For many, they would never get over the disruption as they simply sought to live quiet, productive lives. Many were not even necessarily supporters of the Patriot cause, yet they suffered like all the rest.
The greatest toll, of course, was the harvest which death took along the way. Although the total number of casualties is not known today and was probably unknown even at the time, it is estimated that the Continentals lost 42 killed at Waverly Heights and perhaps as many as 30-40 under Morgan’s and Gist’s commands, according to sources on both sides. Indeed, the men buried in front of you were among those fallen under the two commanders. The number of British and Hessian soldiers killed and wounded was around 100. (Estimates run as high as 500 British wounded from the American side, but this number was probably exaggerated. It is also interesting to note that the number of deserters from the British and Hessian ranks was considerable, far outstripping the wounded and dead.) Most of the dead from these skirmishes were buried near where they died in unmarked graves, like those before you. How many people over the years have stepped over these final resting places, completely unaware of the significance of the spot as well as the tragedy and sacrifice which took place just steps away? Perhaps the best way to end this interlude in our narrative is to consider the following.
We now depart for a brief spell from the narrative to consider the four markers at the base of the flagpole before you. In 1855, a Mr. Russell Smith purchased a piece of land alongside the south face of Edgehill, not far from this spot, where much of the fighting on December 7 had taken place. In 1861 his daughter, Mary, while playing in the woods, found a relic of the battle: a bayonet. After further investigation by the family, more artifacts were uncovered as well as the remains of four unidentified bodies. It was determined that these were Continental soldiers who died during the fighting and were buried, together, near where they died. Here they reposed for almost another hundred years. In 1953, however, Xanthus Smith, Russell Smith’s grandson, allowed the bodies to be exhumed and moved to their present location. The re-interment took place on Memorial Day of the same year.
As one contemplates the final resting place of these four unknown soldiers, it is perhaps appropriate to consider the terrible toll of war, including the one under consideration. The devastation brought by the conflict to the area is in many ways incalculable. Both sides required supplies to carry on, but nothing compared to the depredations carried out by the British and Hessian forces while roaming the area. Personal property was despoiled, including crops and livestock on farms. In some cases, residents of the area were personally assaulted. Houses were burned with total disregard for the innocent. Families were displaced and forced out into the cold of winter with no provisions to sustain them. Hardest hit were the residences along Germantown Road. At war’s end, the American government was submitted with various claims by people from these neighborhoods. The following is but a sampling: Julius Kerper - £1,750, Henry Cress - £1,275, Wigard Miller - £680, Mathias Bush - £640, John Biddis - £625, Christopher Yeakel - £290, William Ottinger - £138, and the list goes on. Even the house of Mathias Bush was pillaged while General Howe made his temporary residence there (see biographies under Bush). Of course, no one can calculate the psychological trauma suffered by those who were victimized during this episode. For many, they would never get over the disruption as they simply sought to live quiet, productive lives. Many were not even necessarily supporters of the Patriot cause, yet they suffered like all the rest.
The greatest toll, of course, was the harvest which death took along the way. Although the total number of casualties is not known today and was probably unknown even at the time, it is estimated that the Continentals lost 42 killed at Waverly Heights and perhaps as many as 30-40 under Morgan’s and Gist’s commands, according to sources on both sides. Indeed, the men buried in front of you were among those fallen under the two commanders. The number of British and Hessian soldiers killed and wounded was around 100. (Estimates run as high as 500 British wounded from the American side, but this number was probably exaggerated. It is also interesting to note that the number of deserters from the British and Hessian ranks was considerable, far outstripping the wounded and dead.) Most of the dead from these skirmishes were buried near where they died in unmarked graves, like those before you. How many people over the years have stepped over these final resting places, completely unaware of the significance of the spot as well as the tragedy and sacrifice which took place just steps away? Perhaps the best way to end this interlude in our narrative is to consider the following.
Unknown Soldiers
The unidentified bodies that lie here on the hill,
Were sons, fathers, friends, and foe.
Each one that is counted solely as a number,
Is a painful and gruesome memory for many.
Each deserves more than a flag in the ground,
Or a passing thought of wonder and respect.
The war that raged, with blood and death;
For the freedom to call it home.
Bodies glistening with sweat,
Passion pouring forth.
Death took more than
One thinks it should ever deserve.
The men buried here, with no high title
or command, beg for our attention.
To these, and all men who fought,
We give thanks at your anonymous tombs
For you’ve etched freedom in our bones.
-Rebekah Dolton
The unidentified bodies that lie here on the hill,
Were sons, fathers, friends, and foe.
Each one that is counted solely as a number,
Is a painful and gruesome memory for many.
Each deserves more than a flag in the ground,
Or a passing thought of wonder and respect.
The war that raged, with blood and death;
For the freedom to call it home.
Bodies glistening with sweat,
Passion pouring forth.
Death took more than
One thinks it should ever deserve.
The men buried here, with no high title
or command, beg for our attention.
To these, and all men who fought,
We give thanks at your anonymous tombs
For you’ve etched freedom in our bones.
-Rebekah Dolton
Proceed to Shoemaker’s Mill. Turn left onto Jenkintown Rd. and proceed to Washington Ln. (Jenkintown Rd. becomes Walnut along the way.) Turn right onto Washington Ln., left onto Township Line Rd. and right onto Old York Rd. Continue to Church Rd. Turn right onto Church Rd. and immediately left onto Shoemaker’s Mill site.
Stop C - Part 2: Shoemaker’s Mill (Refer to December 8 Maps - Edge Hill and Retreat)
There are some historical markers at this location, including the location of the mill along with the events that occurred at this site on December 8 during the British retreat.
The next morning, Washington prepared the talented Morgan to make a direct attack on Howe’s right and sent an additional 35 men to fight with the riflemen. He also sent dragoons out into the valley to scout out more information about the British army. Foraging parties from the British camp made their usual rounds of plundering and in some cases destroying properties. That afternoon, Howe called a meeting with his brigade officers and relayed the news of his uneasiness. The British, who had already encountered the Americans again at Edge Hill, were pulled back in retreat, this time their path taking them truly away from Whitemarsh. Around 2:00 p.m., Cornwallis and Knyphausen turned their backs on the Americans and started to march. They were headed to Philadelphia, and would not turn back now that its comfort awaited them. As the British left, Howe had instructed them to leave campfires burning in order to confuse the Americans and distract them from their retreat. Yet the Continentals noticed what was happening, and one soldier rode to Camp Hill to inform Washington. The main column under Cornwallis and Knyphausen made their way from Susquehanna Road and Jenkintown Road onto York Road. Once Grey had gathered all of his men, about an hour after the others, he started marching on Limekiln Road and then onto Church Road. By this point, Washington knew that Howe’s movement was, in fact, a retreat and he dispatched men under Major General John Kalb to take stabs at the British from behind. The Americans met up with Grey on Church Road, but Grey was able to push these Continentals back using his Light Infantry and Jägers. Grey then continued on to meet up with the main column by utilizing a smaller route of Church Road. Along the way and once Grey had caught up, the British army stopped at a place called Shoemaker’s Mill. Here, Grey’s Hessian column ruined the mill and stole its livestock and goods. To complete their path of destruction, the three columns burned the Rising Sun Tavern to the ground once they had reached the intersection with Germantown Road. This inn had been used as a resource by Washington, who had sent spies and supplies to and from its location to oppose the British. By this point, Washington had heard of the British movement, and he sent dragoons to snipe at their stragglers from afar. The bulk of the British army was approaching the safety of Philadelphia though, and the Americans soon backed down and returned to Whitemarsh. The Battle of Whitemarsh had come to a close with neither army suffering mass destruction or devastating defeat.
Washington was able to breathe a sigh of relief. He knew that the British would keep to the city for most of the winter and that the intense mind games he had been occupied with over the past couple of days were over for a time. His army had pulled through, featuring newfound heroes and bravery. They had proven themselves through the dutiful protection of their presence at Whitemarsh. Howe had escaped without falling for a trap. The Continentals were now in for a long, cold, winter.
Proceed to Fort Hill. To get there, turn left out of the Shoemaker’s Mill site and proceed on Church Road to Bethlehem Pike. Turn right onto Bethlehem Pike and proceed to Fort Hill, your starting point. Proceed to the top of the hill.
There are some historical markers at this location, including the location of the mill along with the events that occurred at this site on December 8 during the British retreat.
The next morning, Washington prepared the talented Morgan to make a direct attack on Howe’s right and sent an additional 35 men to fight with the riflemen. He also sent dragoons out into the valley to scout out more information about the British army. Foraging parties from the British camp made their usual rounds of plundering and in some cases destroying properties. That afternoon, Howe called a meeting with his brigade officers and relayed the news of his uneasiness. The British, who had already encountered the Americans again at Edge Hill, were pulled back in retreat, this time their path taking them truly away from Whitemarsh. Around 2:00 p.m., Cornwallis and Knyphausen turned their backs on the Americans and started to march. They were headed to Philadelphia, and would not turn back now that its comfort awaited them. As the British left, Howe had instructed them to leave campfires burning in order to confuse the Americans and distract them from their retreat. Yet the Continentals noticed what was happening, and one soldier rode to Camp Hill to inform Washington. The main column under Cornwallis and Knyphausen made their way from Susquehanna Road and Jenkintown Road onto York Road. Once Grey had gathered all of his men, about an hour after the others, he started marching on Limekiln Road and then onto Church Road. By this point, Washington knew that Howe’s movement was, in fact, a retreat and he dispatched men under Major General John Kalb to take stabs at the British from behind. The Americans met up with Grey on Church Road, but Grey was able to push these Continentals back using his Light Infantry and Jägers. Grey then continued on to meet up with the main column by utilizing a smaller route of Church Road. Along the way and once Grey had caught up, the British army stopped at a place called Shoemaker’s Mill. Here, Grey’s Hessian column ruined the mill and stole its livestock and goods. To complete their path of destruction, the three columns burned the Rising Sun Tavern to the ground once they had reached the intersection with Germantown Road. This inn had been used as a resource by Washington, who had sent spies and supplies to and from its location to oppose the British. By this point, Washington had heard of the British movement, and he sent dragoons to snipe at their stragglers from afar. The bulk of the British army was approaching the safety of Philadelphia though, and the Americans soon backed down and returned to Whitemarsh. The Battle of Whitemarsh had come to a close with neither army suffering mass destruction or devastating defeat.
Washington was able to breathe a sigh of relief. He knew that the British would keep to the city for most of the winter and that the intense mind games he had been occupied with over the past couple of days were over for a time. His army had pulled through, featuring newfound heroes and bravery. They had proven themselves through the dutiful protection of their presence at Whitemarsh. Howe had escaped without falling for a trap. The Continentals were now in for a long, cold, winter.
Proceed to Fort Hill. To get there, turn left out of the Shoemaker’s Mill site and proceed on Church Road to Bethlehem Pike. Turn right onto Bethlehem Pike and proceed to Fort Hill, your starting point. Proceed to the top of the hill.
Stop D - Part 2: Fort Hill
Following the British retreat to Philadelphia on the 8th, Washington made the decision to move away from Whitemarsh and eventually to Valley Forge. Although some wanted to move the army farther away from the British, Washington believed that staying in proximity to Philadelphia would afford some protection to the people of the area from the foraging expeditions of the British. At the same time, it would be far enough away to avoid a surprise attack from Howe, as remote as that possibility seemed by that point.
Having dispersed the sick and wounded to various “hospitals,” but leaving many sick and wounded at Whitemarsh, Washington, on December 11th, began the march toward Valley Forge. Leading the column was the Pennsylvania Militia under General Potter. They proceeded up Skippack Pike to present day Butler Pike and swung to the left. This was the intersection to which the British had pursued the fleeing Continental Army following the defeat at Germantown. Once on Butler Pike, the column proceeded to Matson’s Ford on the Schuylkill River, near present day Conshohocken. There the soldiers put together a temporary bridge and crossed over. Not long after reaching the other side the militia ran into advanced units of a British column led by none other than General Cornwallis. The British column had crossed over the river near Philadelphia on a foraging expedition to the west of the city. A firefight ensued and the militia was driven back across the river, tearing up the temporary bridge as they fled. Washington was now stuck, or so it seemed. After a temporary decision to halt, the army eventually moved further up the river to Swede’s Ford near Norristown. Here, the army made its crossing unmolested and proceeded to the area of Gulph Mills, where it encamped for several days in exceedingly wintry weather before finally continuing on to Valley Forge on the 19th. It was at Gulph Mills on the 17th that Washington put forth the following general orders, emphasizing his conviction to remain in the vicinity to protect the citizens from the ravages of the enemy:
The General ardently wishes it were now in his power to conduct the troops into the best winter quarters; but where are they to be found? Should we retire to the interior of the State, we would find it crowded with virtuous citizens, who, sacrificing their all, have left Philadelphia and fled hither for protection; to their distress humanity forbids us to add. This is not all. We should leave a vast extent of country to be despoiled and ravaged by the enemy, from which they would draw vast supplies, and where many of our firm friends would be exposed to all the miseries of an insulting and wanton depredation. A train of evils might be enumerated, but these will suffice. These considerations make it indispensably necessary for the army to take such a position as will enable it most effectually to prevent distress, and give the most extensive security; and in that position, we must make ourselves the best shelter in our power.
These urgent reasons have determined the General to take post in the neighborhood of this camp, and influenced by them, he persuades himself that the officers and soldiers, with one heart and one mind, will resolve to surmount every difficulty with a fortitude and patience becoming their profession, and the sacred cause in which they are engaged.
Following the British retreat to Philadelphia on the 8th, Washington made the decision to move away from Whitemarsh and eventually to Valley Forge. Although some wanted to move the army farther away from the British, Washington believed that staying in proximity to Philadelphia would afford some protection to the people of the area from the foraging expeditions of the British. At the same time, it would be far enough away to avoid a surprise attack from Howe, as remote as that possibility seemed by that point.
Having dispersed the sick and wounded to various “hospitals,” but leaving many sick and wounded at Whitemarsh, Washington, on December 11th, began the march toward Valley Forge. Leading the column was the Pennsylvania Militia under General Potter. They proceeded up Skippack Pike to present day Butler Pike and swung to the left. This was the intersection to which the British had pursued the fleeing Continental Army following the defeat at Germantown. Once on Butler Pike, the column proceeded to Matson’s Ford on the Schuylkill River, near present day Conshohocken. There the soldiers put together a temporary bridge and crossed over. Not long after reaching the other side the militia ran into advanced units of a British column led by none other than General Cornwallis. The British column had crossed over the river near Philadelphia on a foraging expedition to the west of the city. A firefight ensued and the militia was driven back across the river, tearing up the temporary bridge as they fled. Washington was now stuck, or so it seemed. After a temporary decision to halt, the army eventually moved further up the river to Swede’s Ford near Norristown. Here, the army made its crossing unmolested and proceeded to the area of Gulph Mills, where it encamped for several days in exceedingly wintry weather before finally continuing on to Valley Forge on the 19th. It was at Gulph Mills on the 17th that Washington put forth the following general orders, emphasizing his conviction to remain in the vicinity to protect the citizens from the ravages of the enemy:
The General ardently wishes it were now in his power to conduct the troops into the best winter quarters; but where are they to be found? Should we retire to the interior of the State, we would find it crowded with virtuous citizens, who, sacrificing their all, have left Philadelphia and fled hither for protection; to their distress humanity forbids us to add. This is not all. We should leave a vast extent of country to be despoiled and ravaged by the enemy, from which they would draw vast supplies, and where many of our firm friends would be exposed to all the miseries of an insulting and wanton depredation. A train of evils might be enumerated, but these will suffice. These considerations make it indispensably necessary for the army to take such a position as will enable it most effectually to prevent distress, and give the most extensive security; and in that position, we must make ourselves the best shelter in our power.
These urgent reasons have determined the General to take post in the neighborhood of this camp, and influenced by them, he persuades himself that the officers and soldiers, with one heart and one mind, will resolve to surmount every difficulty with a fortitude and patience becoming their profession, and the sacred cause in which they are engaged.
Aftermath
The old saying, “nothing ventured, nothing gained” may aptly characterize the significance of the Battle of Whitemarsh. In the end, nothing really came out of Howe’s venture between December 4–8. Both sides remained relatively unscathed, since there had been no major engagement of the two armies. For Howe, the trip had not afforded his desire to direct one final blow against his adversary. The cost of life, able soldiers (now wounded) and provisions had gained him very little if anything. Although the general would get one last attempt to gain a victory before returning to England—against the Marquis de Lafayette at Barren Hill months later—an ultimate victory against Washington would never materialize. Probably one of the greatest costs of the expedition had been the loyalty of many Tories and fence-sitters in the area. The depredations carried out by both British soldiers and Hessian mercenaries were extreme. Even the British command felt so as courts martial were carried out against the perpetrators. If anything, the foray toward Whitemarsh had solidified the Patriot cause in the region. The people would be glad to see both armies leave the region by early summer, but especially the now-hated English.
For Washington, even though he was not able to entice the British onto the field near the hills of Whitemarsh, offering the possibility of a major victory over them, he could breathe a great sigh of relief. Tactically opposing Howe in the field would have been a dice throw for Washington at best. Washington had never engaged his opponent in the open field and been victorious. Nevertheless, Washington reported to Henry Laurens, president of the Congress, the following:
I sincerely wish that they had made an Attack; the Issue in all probability, from the disposition of our troops and the strong situation of our camp, would have been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must add that reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbade us quitting our post to attack them. Nothing but Success would have justified the measure, and this could not be expected from their position.
As the months at Valley Forge would prove, the Continental Army was probably still not ready for such a pitched battle. Nevertheless, Washington and his troops could take solace in the fact that they were still intact, having remained relatively unscathed. Washington would have his army to fight another day.
Finis
The old saying, “nothing ventured, nothing gained” may aptly characterize the significance of the Battle of Whitemarsh. In the end, nothing really came out of Howe’s venture between December 4–8. Both sides remained relatively unscathed, since there had been no major engagement of the two armies. For Howe, the trip had not afforded his desire to direct one final blow against his adversary. The cost of life, able soldiers (now wounded) and provisions had gained him very little if anything. Although the general would get one last attempt to gain a victory before returning to England—against the Marquis de Lafayette at Barren Hill months later—an ultimate victory against Washington would never materialize. Probably one of the greatest costs of the expedition had been the loyalty of many Tories and fence-sitters in the area. The depredations carried out by both British soldiers and Hessian mercenaries were extreme. Even the British command felt so as courts martial were carried out against the perpetrators. If anything, the foray toward Whitemarsh had solidified the Patriot cause in the region. The people would be glad to see both armies leave the region by early summer, but especially the now-hated English.
For Washington, even though he was not able to entice the British onto the field near the hills of Whitemarsh, offering the possibility of a major victory over them, he could breathe a great sigh of relief. Tactically opposing Howe in the field would have been a dice throw for Washington at best. Washington had never engaged his opponent in the open field and been victorious. Nevertheless, Washington reported to Henry Laurens, president of the Congress, the following:
I sincerely wish that they had made an Attack; the Issue in all probability, from the disposition of our troops and the strong situation of our camp, would have been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must add that reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbade us quitting our post to attack them. Nothing but Success would have justified the measure, and this could not be expected from their position.
As the months at Valley Forge would prove, the Continental Army was probably still not ready for such a pitched battle. Nevertheless, Washington and his troops could take solace in the fact that they were still intact, having remained relatively unscathed. Washington would have his army to fight another day.
Finis
(N.B., please find sources and footnotes in digitized copy on Home Page.)
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